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ABSTRACT 
Building resilience to disasters helps reduce loss of life and property, allowing 
communities to recover more quickly from shocks and disruptions. Governing 
institutions are tasked with tremendous responsibility in terms of mitigating risks and 
enhancing resilience of local communities through proactive planning and policies. It is 
important to examine how institutional policies have changed pre- and post-disaster to 
determine their contribution to community resilience. Metrics and indicators can be used 
to quantitatively assess, establish baseline, track, and monitor resilience at the community 
level. Few studies have attempted to measure institutional resilience using a set of 
indicators and metrics, and even fewer explore the conceptual gaps between academic 
research on hazards and emergency management practice. 
This research investigates the utility of the Baseline Resilience Indicators for 
Communities (BRIC) institutional resilience (IR) sub-index in a context-specific case 
study. This study replicates the BRIC IR sub-index, aggregated at the state scale, for 
eighty-two counties in Mississippi in the context of pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina. 
Difference of means and median tests along with evaluating of change in ranking were 
utilized to determine the drivers of change in institutional resilience from 2000 to 2010 
for the state of Mississippi and for Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties. In addition, 
content analysis of state and local hazard mitigation plans (HMPs) provides contextual 
information to explain observed changes in institutional resilience metrics as well as in 
post-disaster mitigation practice. 
vi 
Mitigation spending, flood insurance coverage, disaster aid experience, 
jurisdictional coordination, and crop insurance coverage are the drivers of change in 
institutional resilience for the state of Mississippi, while only the first three indicators 
along with population stability are the drivers for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties. Increases in mitigation spending and flood insurance coverage can be directly 
attributed to Hurricane Katrina. Content analysis of state and local HMPs suggests that 
the theoretical basis of BRIC IR indicators is reflective of mitigation practice. In addition, 
there are substantial improvements in the post-Hurricane Katrina HMPs in the categories 
of hazard identification, jurisdictional coordination, reporting of loss data, hazard 
modeling, participation in the National Flood Insurance Program, and social vulnerability 
assessment.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Over the previous fifty years, total losses in the United States from weather-
related events have increased tremendously (Cutter and Emrich 2005; Barthel and 
Neumayer 2012; Hallegatte et al. 2013; Preston 2013). Urban population growth and 
persistent development in or near the coastal zones contribute to greater exposure of lives 
and properties (Klein et al. 2003b). Inhabitants and institutions are often ill-prepared and 
ill-equipped as they lack the adaptive capacity and coping mechanisms to absorb the 
potential for loss and recover from disturbances (Cutter et al. 2008b). In recent decades, 
notable meteorological hazards like Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy (2012) and Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) wrought havoc in U.S. coastal communities, causing losses and damage in 
the tens of billions of dollars (Waple 2005; Blake et al. 2013). Disruptions to local 
economic activities and social functions were followed by long and strenuous 
reconstruction periods (Cutter et al. 2006; Manuel 2013). As local communities struggle 
with potential devastation posed by natural hazard events and emerging climate change 
impacts, it is no longer sufficient for these communities to assess only the physical and 
social vulnerability of a particular area or population. Rather, this process of vulnerability 
assessment must be carried out in tandem with evaluating and enhancing a community’s 
disaster resilience (National Preparedness Goal 2011; IPCC 2012). 
Current disaster policies push for guidelines on how to incorporate resilience as a 
means of mitigating disaster impacts. In 2012, the National Research Council argued that 
it is necessary to evaluate and benchmark the baseline conditions that contribute to
 2 
community resilience as well as measure the factors affecting the capacity of 
communities to respond to and rebound from adverse impacts of an event. This can be 
accomplished through the construction of resilience metrics and social indicators 
(Birkmann 2007; Cutter et al. 2010). Resilience metrics and indicators are useful tools in 
terms of measuring community resilience levels. Indicators can be employed when 
setting policy goals in mitigation planning or as screening tools to set baselines and 
assess temporal and spatial changes (Birkmann 2007; Frazier 2013). Metrics and 
indicators, however, provide limited and generalized representations of reality and do not 
capture all of the complex facets of resilience. It is necessary to carry out further research 
to understand resilience indicators both in terms of the approaches used to build them and 
their usefulness in real-world applications (Fekete 2009; Tate 2012; Frazier 2013; Singh-
Peterson et al. 2015).  
1.1 Research Goals and Contributions 
The purpose of this thesis is evaluate and contextualize the output metrics of the 
Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) index through replication of the 
institutional resilience sub-index at the state and content analysis of hazard mitigation 
plans. It conducts a longitudinal assessment of institutional resilience in a real-world 
application using the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the context of pre- and post-Hurricane 
Katrina as a case study. It also examines the disaster governance structure of the state of 
Mississippi by exploring how mitigation practices have changed in the post-Katrina 
period. The mixed method approach aims to acquire a better sense of institutional 
resilience both in academic and practical settings. It also provides a crucial opportunity 
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for bridging conceptual gaps between researchers and practitioners in the disaster 
management realm.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions provide the focus for this thesis: 
1. How has the institutional resilience for the Mississippi Gulf Coast, conceptualized 
as BRIC indicators, changed in the setting of pre- and post-Katrina? 
2. Do state and local mitigation plans explain or indicate changes in institutional 
resilience metrics for the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the setting of pre- and post-
Katrina? 
Chapter 2 provides a literature overview of the theoretical and practical 
orientation of resilience, focusing on the institutional aspect. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
background of BRIC index, the institutional resilience indicators and the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast as study area. Next, Chapter 4 details the methodology and results of the BRIC 
institutional resilience sub-index in the context of pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina. 
Chapter 5 contains the examination of state and local hazard mitigation plans regarding 
how they have changed within the respective timeframe. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the 
significances of the findings and suggests improvements for hazard mitigation plans as 
well as new indicators of institutional resilience.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Conceptualizing Disaster Resilience 
There are numerous ways in which resilience is conceptualized but there is “no 
broadly accepted single definition” between the environmental science, hazard and 
practitioner communities (Klein et al. 2003a; Manyena 2006; Cutter et al. 2008b, 599). 
Etymologically, the concept of resilience stemmed from resilio or resilire, meaning to 
“bounce” in Latin and has a long history rooted in the classical arts, literature, law, 
engineering, computer science, and social sciences (Alexander 2013). In recent years, the 
number of academic works relating to resilience have skyrocketed in social science 
research including disciplines such as geography, sociology, psychology and public 
health (Renschler et al. 2010; Zhou et al. 2010; Chamlee-Wright Storr 2011; Miles and 
Chang 2011; Cox and Perry 2011; Aldrich 2012; Berkes and Ross 2013; Morton and 
Lurie 2013; Plough et al. 2013; Tidball and Stedman 2013; Cutter et al. 2014b).  
Holling (1973) was one of the first to describe resilience as a measure of the 
ability of a system to absorb change and persist after disturbances. In other words, a 
resilient system is one that can absorb shocks and still function. Another aspect of 
resilience concerns the capacity for renewal, re-organization and development (Folke 
2006). Given these characteristics, two different framings of resilience emerge: 
ecological and engineering resilience. The global environmental change literature 
identifies with the ecological framing of resilience, which emphasizes the adaptive ability 
to cope with and learn from unpredictability (Manyena 2014). It examines resilience in
5 
relation to the long-term impacts of climate change. Adger (2000) explains the linkage 
between ecological resilience and social resilience in terms of human resource 
dependency on the natural environment, a process he observed in developing societies 
whose livelihoods and social order are intricately intertwined with the availability of 
natural resources. In later work, Adger et al. (2005) suggests that socio-ecological 
resilience refers to the capacity of a complex system to execute self-organization through 
adaptive learning and preparing for uncertainty and surprise. As such, socio-ecological 
resilience is directly related to adaptive capacity, or the ability of a system to adjust to 
change, moderate the effects and cope with a disturbance (Smit and Wandel 2006; Engle 
2011).  
 Engineering resilience refers to resistance to disturbance, the ability to maintain 
an acceptable level of functioning, and speedy return to a single static equilibrium 
(McDaniels et al. 2008). It is closely associated with short-term coping with specific 
natural hazards, relating to concepts such as vulnerability, preparedness, response, and 
recovery (Birkmann 2006b; Paton 2006; Walsh 2007; Norris et al. 2008; Twiggs 2009; 
Wells et al. 2013). It can be applied at different scales to individuals, households, 
institutions, cities, regions or nations (Aguirre 2005; Bonnano et al. 2007; Butler 2007; 
Hassink 2009; Joerin and Shaw 2011; Manyena 2014). In the hazard literature, resilience 
can be defined as “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more 
successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events” (NRC 2012, 16). It also refers to 
the capacity to rapidly restore system function to pre-disaster level (UNISDR 2009). 
Norris et al. (2008) discuss the notion of resilience as a set of capacities, which can be 
enhanced by economic and community resources. Others focus on engineered structures 
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and land-use planning, which seek to minimize the impacts of disasters and quickly 
restore crucial services and lifelines (Bruneau et al. 2003; Rose 2007; McAllister 2013).  
Berkes and Ross (2013) introduce an integrated concept of community resilience, 
attempting to unify the two disparate framings mentioned above. Characteristics such as 
adaptive capacity, flexibility, social networks and self-organization are desired traits in 
both ecological and engineered framing of resilience. These traits can be fostered through 
community development and community-based planning. Communities should strive to 
attain general resilience to a wide range of uncertainties and surprises while recognizing 
that building disaster resilience to specific hazards is also important. 
2.2 Disaster Resilience at the Community Level 
 Many current works and research on disaster explore how to enhance resilience, 
ideally at the community level. This section features various definitions of community 
resilience and its conceptualizations at the community scale. Community is a complex 
and difficult concept to define because it can range from “grass-roots groups and 
neighborhoods to complex amalgams of formal institutions and sectors in larger 
geopolitical units” (Norris et al. 2008, 128).  
From a hazard perspective, the spatial dimension remains crucial in terms of 
identifying socially and physically vulnerable populations based on geographical 
locations. Such spatial framing of community should acknowledge that individuals 
identify membership based on diverse factors such as occupation, religion, socio-
economic status, gender or recreational activities, among others (Twigg 2007; Berkes and 
Ross 2013). As such, a community should be examined based on its spatial location as 
well as the socio-demographic characteristics of its population.  
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Community resilience is generally discussed in terms of the capacity, ability, and 
resources to cope with and bounce back from exposure to a disruptive event and also 
future events (Table 2.1). The process of building and enhancing community resilience 
can be achieved in the preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery phases. Two 
central aspects of community resilience are social learning and social capital. Resilience 
is associated with social learning, or the ability to self-organize, which enables 
communities to incorporate post-disaster lessons into planning and policies in order to be 
more prepared for the next disaster (Cutter et al. 2008b; Manyena 2014). Social capital is 
linked to the ability of a community to self-organize in the response and recovery period 
(Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Aldrich 2012). Mutual assistance from social networks can 
benefit members of a group in terms of providing financial and social support in times of 
crisis.  
Beyond the social components, community resilience also relates to the capability 
of the built environment to resist and rapidly recover from disruptive events (McAllister 
2013). This means that critical facilities and lifelines need to be operational and 
functional during and after hazard events to support other aspects of community 
resilience. As such, community resilience is a multi-dimensional concept that can be 
applied to examine the social system and the built environment in the context of pre- and 
post-disaster.
8 
Table 2.1: Selected definitions of community resilience. 
 
Citations Definition (direct quotes)  
Timmerman 1981 A system's capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous 
event; reflective of a society's ability to cope and to continue to cope in the 
future 
Wildavsky 1991 The capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back 
Comfort et al. 1999 The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems and 
operating conditions 
Mileti 1999 (The ability to) withstand an extreme event without suffering devastating 
losses, damage, diminished productivity, or quality of life without a large 
amount of assistance from outside the community 
Paton 2000 The capability to bounce back and to use physical and economic resources 
effectively to aid recovery following exposure to hazards 
Chenoweth and 
Stehlik 2001 
The ability to respond to crises in ways that strengthen community bonds, 
resources, and the community's capacity to cope 
Bruneau et al. 2003 The ability of social units to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters 
when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize social 
disruption and mitigate the effects of future earthquakes 
Ganor and Ben-
Lavy 2003 
The ability of individuals and communities to deal with a state of continuous 
long term stress; the ability to find unknown inner strengths and resources in 
order to cope effectively; the measure of adaptation and flexibility 
Godschalk 2003 A sustainable network of physical systems and human communities, capable of 
managing extreme events; during disaster, both must be able to survive and 
function under extreme stress 
Coles and Buckle 
2004 
A community’s capacities, skills, and knowledge that allow it to participate 
fully in recovery from disasters 
Norris et al.  2008 A process linking a set of networked adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory 
of functioning and adaptation in constituent populations after a disturbance 
UNISDR 2009 The ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through preservation and restoration of basic 
structures and functions.  
Magis 2010 The existence, development, and engagement of community resources by 
community members to thrive in an environment characterized by change, 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and surprise 
Acosta et al. 2011 The ongoing and developing capacity of the community to account for its 
vulnerabilities and develop capabilities that aid that community in (1) 
preventing, withstanding, and mitigating the stress of a health incident; (2) 
recovering in a way that restores the community to a state of self-sufficiency 
and at least the same level of health and social functioning after a health 
incident; and (3) using knowledge from a past response to strengthen the 
community’s ability to withstand the next health incident. 
Cox and Perry 2011 A reflection of people's shared and unique capacities to manage and adaptively 
respond to the extraordinary demands on resources and losses associated with 
disasters  
Berkes and Ross 
2013 
Communities do not control all of the conditions that affect them, but they 
have the ability to change many of the conditions that can increase their 
resilience. They can build resilience through their responses to shocks and 
stress, and actively develop resilience through capacity building and social 
learning.  
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2.2.1 Community Disaster Resilience Frameworks 
In the last decade, there have been increased efforts to create conceptual 
frameworks and models to operationalize resilience. Bruneau et al. (2003) provides a 
seismic resilience framework for communities introducing the four R’s: robustness, 
redundancy, rapidity and resourcefulness. These four R’s have been influential in the 
conceptualization of many subsequent resilience frameworks. For example, Rose and 
Krausmann (2013) construct an economic resilience index to measure business recovery 
in post-disaster periods. This framework applies the four R’s from Bruneau et al. (2003) 
as proxies for economic performance indicators. Norris et al. (2008) utilize the 
robustness, redundancy and rapidity concepts to generate a resilience index at the 
community level which defines resilience as a set of networked adaptive capacities 
composed of factors relating to economic development, information communication, 
social capital and community competence. Renschler et al. (2010a) introduce the 
PEOPLES Resilience Framework that highlight seven aspects of community resilience 
regarding to population and demographics, environmental and ecosystems, organized 
governmental services, physical infrastructure, lifestyle and community competence, 
economic development, and socio-cultural capital. Lastly, Cutter et al. (2008b) propose 
the Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model, which focuses on social resilience at the 
community level (Figure 2.1). The authors draw from multiple influences, defining 
disaster resilience as: 
The ability of a social system to respond and recover from disaster 
includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts 
and cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes that 
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facilitate the ability of the social system to re-organize, change and learn 
to respond to a threat (Cutter et al. 2008b, 599). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model (Cutter et al. 2008b). 
 
Resilience in the post-disaster setting will not only allow the affected population 
to “bounce back” quickly, but also “bounce forward” to adapt appropriately in 
preparation for the next disturbance (Manyena et al. 2011). The DROP model theorized 
that there are sets of inherent vulnerability and resilience, which exist at the nexus of 
social systems, natural systems and the built environment. This conceptualization points 
to two qualities of resilience: inherent and adaptive. Inherent resilience refers to the 
system components that function well during non-crisis periods, while adaptive resilience 
is the flexibility of system in the post-disaster period. Adaptive resilience consists 
improvisation and social learning which should be incorporate back into the system as 
part of inherent resilience in the post-disaster period (Rose 2004). These two 
qualifications can be applied to infrastructure, institutions, organizations, social systems, 
or economic systems (Cutter et al. 2008b). 
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2.2.2 Resilience Indices and Applications 
The Committee that produced the report, Disaster Resilience: A National 
Imperative, for the National Research Council recognized the need for resilience 
measurement (NRC 2012). Quantitative means of assessment allow key actors and 
institutions to prioritize investments and needs, monitor progress, and compare the 
benefits of increasing resilience with associated costs. Resilience metrics and indicators 
can be applied to set targets, establish goals for improvement, and provide quantitative 
measures for ranking and monitoring resilience factors. These can also be a way to unify 
disparate views of stakeholders around a consensus (Cutter et al. 2013). In addition, 
quantitative analysis of resilience indices can help inform local and national 
policymakers about changes in the socioeconomic structure of at-risk communities 
(Sherrieb et al. 2010). 
There are various contemporary indices that have emerged from resilience 
conceptual frameworks (NRC 2012). Notable examples include: Rose (2004)’s economic 
resilience index at multiple market scales, Mayunga (2007)’s capital-based approach the 
Community Disaster Resilience Index, Carreno et al. (2007)’s Risk Management Index 
on public and institutional policies, Cutter et al. (2010)’s Baseline Resilience Indicators 
for Communities Index,  Sherrieb et al. (2010)’s Community Resilience Index based on 
economic development and social capital, Orencio and Fujii (2013)’s localized disaster-
resilience index to assess coastal communities, and  Miles and Chang (2013)’s ResilUS 
for measuring hazard-related damage and recovery over time.  
Some of the previously mentioned resilience indices have been put into 
applications (Table 2.2). These case studies are usually place-based because resilience 
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can be better understood within a specific geographical, spatial and cultural context 
(Berkes and Ross 2013). Some case studies attempt to validate the resilience metrics by 
comparing them against social vulnerability and recovery metrics while others examine 
the utilities of the indicators and metrics by soliciting opinions of emergency 
practitioners. Sherrieb et al. (2010) apply the community resilience model by Norris et al. 
(2008) to examine economic development and social capital for the state of Mississippi at 
the county level. The authors utilize the metrics from eleven indicators from the Social 
Vulnerability Index (SoVI) to validate their resilience index. They find that community 
resilience along with community capital and economic development are negatively 
correlated with social vulnerability. Bergstrand et al. (2015) adopt this method by 
Sherrieb et al. (2010) and replicate the Social Vulnerability Index and the Community 
Resilience at the national level. Their findings suggest that there is a relationship between 
resilience and social vulnerability; however, this relationship is varied based on regional 
differences. On the other hand, Burton (2015) evaluates the relationship of resilience 
indicators (similar to those of BRIC) and disaster recovery at the block group level by 
comparing them in a case study of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. His findings suggest that 
certain indicators have the potential to be externally validated using post-disaster 
recovery activities. 
13 
Table 2.2: Selected framework-based resilience indices and case-study applications. 
 
Resilience 
Framework 
Domains  Resilience Index  Case-study Applications 
Disaster 
Resilience of 
Place 
(DROP) 
Model 
(Cutter et al. 
2008b) 
Social, Economic, 
Institutional, 
Infrastructural, Community 
Capital, Ecological 
Baseline 
Resilience 
Indicators for 
Communities 
(BRIC) Index 
(Cutter et al. 
2014b) 
FEMA Region IV, U.S. 
(Cutter et al. 2010) 
United States (Cutter et al. 
2014b) 
Sarasota County, FL (Frazier 
et al. 2013) 
Sunshine Coast, Australia 
(Singh-Peterson et al. 2013)  
Indonesia (Kusumastuti et al. 
2014) 
Mississippi Gulf Coast, U.S. 
(Burton 2015) 
Capital-
based 
strategies 
(Mayunga 
2007) 
Social Capital, Economic 
Capital. Human Capital, 
Physical Capital, Natural 
Capital  
Community 
Disaster 
Resilience Index 
(Mayunga 2007) 
Gulf Coast region, U.S. 
(Mayunga 2007) 
 
Community 
Capacity 
(Norris et al. 
2008) 
Economic Development, 
Social Capital, Information 
and Communication, 
Community  Competence   
Community 
Resilience Index 
(Sherrieb et al. 
2010)  
State of Mississippi, U.S. 
(Sherrieb et al. 2010) 
United States (Bergstrand et 
al. 2015) 
4 R’s 
framework 
(Bruneau et 
al. 2003) 
Robustness, Redundancy, 
Resourcefulness, Rapidity 
Properties of 
Resilience (Chang 
and Shinozuka 
2004) 
Memphis, TN (Cimellaro et al. 
2010) 
Memphis, TN (Chang and 
Shinozuka 2004) 
Economic 
Resilience 
(Rose 2004) 
Inherent Resilience 
Computable 
General 
Equilibrium 
(CGE) Model  
Portland, OR (Rose 2004) 
PEOPLES 
(Renschler et 
al. 2010a) 
Population and 
Demographics, 
Environmental/Ecosystems, 
Organized Governmental 
Services, Physical 
Infrastructure, 
Lifestyle & Community 
Competence, Economic 
Development, Social-
Cultural Capital  
PEOPLES 
(Renschler et al. 
2010b) 
San Francisco, CA (Martinelli 
et al. 2014) 
Disaster-
Resilient 
Coastal 
Community 
(Orencio and 
Fujii 2013) 
Environmental and Natural 
Resource Management, 
Sustainable Livelihood, 
Social Protection, Planning 
Regimes 
Coastal 
Community 
Disaster 
Resilience Index 
(Orencio 2014) 
none 
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Frazier et al. (2013) and Singh-Peterson et al. (2014) exemplify several studies 
that evaluate the application of the BRIC index in a context-specific research. Frazier et 
al. (2013) explore the application of BRIC for Sarasota County, Florida. The authors 
conduct reviews of different types of current hazard mitigation plans and construct a 
checklist of resilience factors using the indicators of the Cutter et al. (2010)’s BRIC 
model as a reference. In addition, they also carry out focus groups with representatives 
from hazard, engineering, public safety and public work sectors, to help identify 
resilience indicators that are applicable to the region. Singh-Peterson et al. (2014) utilize 
the BRIC indicators (Cutter et al. 2010) to construct baseline resilience index for the 
Sunshine Coast of Australia using national data sources as well as for surveying 
representatives from telecommunication, energy, water, health, and emergency service 
sectors. This study examines the usefulness of the adapted BRIC as a top-down 
assessment tool. Based on survey analysis of planners, Singh-Peterson et al. (2014) 
conclude that BRIC is not suited to the Sunshine Coast local government area because of 
the omission of environmental resilience and regional and local diversity themes in Cutter 
et al. (2010). Similar to the Sunshine Coast study, the results from Frazier et al. (2013) 
suggest that there are several temporal, scalar and geographical limitations associated 
with quantitative resilience indicators. Both Singh-Peterson et al. (2014) and Frazier et al. 
(2013) stress the importance of consultations with practitioners and incorporate their 
suggestions into the construction of a resilience index, bridging the gap between 
academic research and practices. 
Although applications of resilience indices are becoming increasingly common, 
they vary in terms of scale (e.g. local, city, national) and geographical area (e.g. 
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developed countries, developing countries). None of the noted examples conducted a 
longitudinal assessment of change in resilience metrics, including in the context of pre- 
and post-disaster. This is true despite the fact that the concept of disaster resilience 
emphasizes the ability or capacity of a community to cope and bounce back from 
disruption (Table 2.2). McAllister (2013) points out that it is important to track and 
monitor resilience metrics before and after hazard events in addition to determining the 
overall resilience of a community. In recognition of this research need, this thesis 
conducts a longitudinal assessment of institutional resilience before and after Hurricane 
Katrina.  
2.3 Roles of Institutions in Building Resilience  
Institutions are often perceived as instrumental to and responsible for the 
resilience of a social system through mitigation actions and reduction of vulnerability 
(Djalante and Thomalla 2011). Adger (2000, 354) states that “social resilience is 
institutionally determined, in the sense that institutions permeate all social systems and 
institutions fundamentally determine the economic system in terms of its structure and 
distribution of assets”. Adaptive policies can help communities lessen the impacts from 
disaster and speed up the recovery periods by reinforcing institutional capacity for 
anticipation and learning. There are multiple factors that contribute to a society’s or 
system’s resilience against the impacts of natural hazards and other forms of disturbance. 
Efforts to examine how resilience can be strengthened or enhanced can be seen in the 
contexts of infrastructural resilience (Bruneau et al. 2003; McDaniels et al. 2008; Rogers 
et al. 2012; Chang et al. 2014), economic resilience (Rose 2007; Simmie and Martin 
2010; Rose and Krausmann 2013), community capital (Norris et al. 2008; Chamlee-
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Wright and Storr 2011; Aldrich 2012; Plough et al. 2013), social resilience (Morrow 
2008; Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013), and institutional resilience (Adger 2000; Godschalk 
2003; Berke and Smith 2009; Manyena 2014). 
Institutions consist of “habitualized behavior and rules and norms that govern 
society as well as the more usual notion of formal institutions with memberships, 
constituencies and stakeholders” (Adger 2000, 348). They also contain “elements that 
measure how organizations manage or respond to disaster such as organizational 
structure, capacity, leadership, training, and experience” (Cutter et al. 2008b, 604). These 
usually take the form of governmental entities, but there have been growing collaborative 
partnerships between public sectors, private organizations and civil society in the 
decision-making process relating to disaster governance (Tierney 2012).  
The capacity of an institution to effectively respond to and cope with natural 
hazard events reflects and contributes to the overall resilience of a system. Proactive 
hazard mitigation planning presumes the inevitability of change and attempts to create a 
system that is capable of adapting to new conditions and scenarios (Godschalk 2003). 
This type of action enhances system resilience by moving it beyond the status quo (Klein 
et al. 2003a; Manyena et al. 2011. Flexibility, vertical and horizontal integration and 
intra-sectorial cooperation regarding institutional management can serve to enhance 
system resilience as opposed to a hierarchical command and control structure (Cutter et 
al. 2008a; Berke and Smith 2009; Smith 2012; Berke et al. 2012).  
Godschalk (2003) and Duxbury and Dickinson (2007) identify several 
mechanisms to bolster resilience against disaster: building code standards, land-use 
planning, at-risk property acquisition, and tax incentives. Other strategies include 
 17 
developing community mitigation capacity, network communication channels between 
different agencies and key actors, actively assessing hazards and risks, assisting socially 
vulnerable populations and spreading public awareness through educational and outreach 
programs. Effective hazard mitigation planning and practices are just two examples of 
instruments that can be executed by governmental institutions to support resilience 
building in communities.  
At the national level, multiple federal disaster frameworks along with programs 
and funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are designed to 
proactively address risk reduction by incentivizing coordination and integration of 
mitigation activities at the state and local levels. In 2000, the federal government passed 
the Disaster Mitigation Act, providing a new set of requirements which states must 
comply with in order to qualify for mitigation grant assistance (Berke and Smith 2009; 
Smith 2012). It also required state and local governments to prepare and implement pre-
disaster mitigation plans (Smith 2011; Godschalk et al. 2009). Furthermore, FEMA has 
different types of grants available for mitigation projects in the forms of post-disaster 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program 
(PDM) and Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA). These programs encourage and 
aid states and local governments in mitigation planning as well as implementing risk 
reduction projects (Rose 2007). Protective actions against hazard risks are beneficial 
investments that can significantly improve public safety by reducing loss of life and 
injuries (Rose 2007). A study by the Multi-hazard Mitigation Council demonstrates that 
on average, for every $1 spent by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on 
hazard mitigation, society derives $4 in future benefits (MMC 2005). 
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2.3.1 Institutional Resilience Indicators 
Few studies have attempted to examine institutional resilience as an individual 
characteristic of system resilience, and even fewer have attempted to measure it by using 
a set of indicators and metrics, particularly in a disaster context (Esnard et al. 2011; 
Ainuddin and Routray 2012; Cutter et al. 2014b; Yoon et al. 2015). For Esnard et al. 
(2011), institutional resilience functions as a component of an index measuring relative 
displacement risk to hurricanes. It consists of state and local disaster planning, mandated 
natural hazard elements and their geographic coverage in local planning, and mandated 
requirements for post-disaster recovery plans. The authors measure these variables as 
binary values, i.e. their presence or absence. 
Another study produced by Ainuddin and Routray (2012) identify mitigation, 
municipal services and awareness as indicators of institutional resilience in their study of 
earthquake hazards in Baluchistan.  Their indicators are associated with the percentage of 
population covered by hazard mitigation plan, percentage of municipal expenditures for 
fire and emergency management system and medical services, and percentage of people 
with earthquake education.  Next, Yoon et al. (2015) develop an institutional resilience 
sub-index for their Community Disaster Resilience Index for South Korea. These 
institutional resilience indicators related to mitigation capacity and preparedness in terms 
of mitigation planning, rainwater outflow reduction planning and detention facilities 
planning.  
Lastly, Cutter et al. (2010) originally proposed eight different BRIC institutional 
indicators for the examination of resilience in the Southeastern region on the U.S. They 
related to mitigation (e.g. population coverage by mitigation plan, Community Rating 
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Systems for Flood, and Storm Ready communities), flood insurance coverage, municipal 
services, political fragmentation, disaster experience, and social connectivity. Cutter et al. 
(2014b) update the BRIC institutional index and expand the list of indicators covering ten 
different aspects of disaster governance at the national scale. The institutional resilience 
score of each county in the U.S. can be calculated using data relating mitigation 
spending, flood insurance coverage, jurisdictional coordination, disaster aid experience, 
performance regime-proximity of county seat to state capital, performance regime-
proximity of county seat to nearest metropolitan statistical area, population stability, 
nuclear accident planning and crop insurance coverage. These are further explained in the 
following chapter.  
Despite the differences in methodological and contextual approach between these 
four studies, the basic logic behind selecting institutional resilience indicators is similar 
in each. First, institutional resilience is regarded as an individual characteristic of overall 
system resilience, along with social, economic, political, infrastructural, and 
environmental resilience. Second, the selection of the indicators is directly related to the 
availability of data sources depending on the temporal and spatial scale of the index. 
Finally, composite indicators are perceived to be useful for evaluating and benchmarking 
the baseline conditions that lead to community resilience as well as providing metrics to 
set priorities and aid in in decision-making processes (Cutter et al. 2010).  
The institutional resilience section from the BRIC index (Cutter et al. 2014b) was 
chosen because its indicators are more likely to experience change post-disaster, 
especially in the mitigation funding and insurance expansion categories (Rose 2007; 
Michel-Kerjan 2010). As such, institutional policies relating to these categories are more 
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actionable because mitigation planning and flood insurance coverage have been shown to 
be economically beneficial to individuals, communities and society (Kunreuther 2006; 
Rose 2007; Yoon et al 2015).  
2.4 Summary 
Resilience is a multi-faceted concept that has been conceptualized, 
operationalized and applied by various disciplines. In the hazard and disaster literature, 
resilience is closely related to mitigation, community resources, engineered structural 
protections, and land-use regulations. There have been many attempts to operationalize 
resilience frameworks into functional indices to benchmark resilience by employing 
metrics and indicators. In the case of institutional resilience, governing institutions are 
tasked with tremendous responsibility in terms of mitigating risks and enhancing 
resilience in their communities. As such, mitigation planning and policies are major parts 
of disaster governance that can affect the process of building and enhancing overall 
community resilience. Application of an institutional resilience index in a context-
specific case study can help shed light on the utility of resilience metrics and indicators at 
varying scale. It is important to examine how institutional resilience, as well as other 
aspects of resilience (e.g. social, economic, infrastructural, community capital and 
ecological), has changed before and after hazard events in order to prioritize and allocate 
resources. In addition, monitoring institutional resilience metrics is crucial in determining 
the effectiveness and weaknesses of mitigation actions.  
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND STUDY AREA 
3.1 Background: Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) Index 
The Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) is a resilience index 
designed to monitor and compare disaster resilience at multiple scales. The Disaster 
Resilience of Place (DROP) model on inherent resilience by Cutter et al. (2008b) 
provides the conceptual framework for BRIC. The data for BRIC mainly came from 
publicly available sources including census population data, FEMA data on flood 
coverage and mitigation planning, non-profits and private sources. BRIC used U.S. 
counties as the spatial unit of analysis because county boundaries are less likely to change 
over time as compared to other census units (e.g. census tracts, block groups). In 
addition, county emergency management institutions are heavily involved in emergency 
management planning, serving as intermediaries between state and municipal 
governments (Cutter et al. 2010; Cutter et al. 2014b).  
The first version of BRIC contained five sub-indices, each with its own selection 
of indicators: social resilience, economic resilience, institutional resilience, infrastructure 
resilience and community capital (Cutter et al. 2010). Cutter et al (2014b) revised BRIC 
to expand the set of indicators for each of these listed components and included an 
additional environmental resilience sub-index. The authors transformed and standardized 
raw data values into comparable scales such as percentages, per capita and density 
functions. Variables were normalized using a min-max rescaling scheme that 
decomposed the values into an identical range between 0 and 1. This standardization
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process was also applied to the sub-component resilience scores. The overall sub-
component score was calculated by summing the normalized value of relevant indicators. 
The final resilience score for each county was constructed by summing the composites of 
the six resilience sub-indices. The scores range from zero to six with higher scores 
indicating greater resilience (Cutter et al. 2014b).  They represent a relative, not absolute, 
measurement of community resilience, which can be used to as comparative tools to 
understand resilience between places.  
3.2 BRIC Institutional Resilience (IR) Indicators 
The institutional resilience sub-index consists of ten indicators: mitigation 
spending, flood insurance coverage, jurisdictional coordination, disaster aid experience, 
local disaster training, performance regime-proximity of county seat to state capital, 
performance regime-proximity of county seat to the nearest metropolitan area, population 
stability, nuclear plant accident planning, and crop insurance coverage (see Table 3.1). 
Each indicator captures different aspects of institutions such as programs, policies, and 
governance structures that contribute to overall community resilience.  
Table 3.1: Institutional resilience indicators, datasets, and temporal timeframes. 
 
IR 
Indicators Descriptions Units 
BRIC 
IR 
2000 
BRIC 
IR 
2010 
Method Data Sources 
Mitigation 
spending 
ten-year-avg per 
capita spending 
for mitigation 
projects 
$ 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2010 
(avg-10-yr) / 
(county pop 
size) 
US Census & 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Grant Program 
Flood 
insurance 
coverage 
% housing units 
covered by 
National Flood 
Insurance 
Program (NFIP) 
% 2000 2010 
(#s of NFIP 
policies) / (#s 
housing units) 
US Census & 
NFIP 
Jurisdictional 
coordination 
governments and 
special districts 
per 10K person 
ratio 2002 2007 
(#s of govts & 
special districts) 
/ (pop 
size/10K)** 
US Census & 
Counties 
Database 
 23 
IR 
Indicators Descriptions Units 
BRIC 
IR 
2000 
BRIC 
IR 
2010 
Method Data Sources 
Disaster 
aid 
experience 
presidential 
disaster 
declarations 
divided by 
number of loss 
causing events 
ratio 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 
(#s of PDD) / 
(#s of 
SHELDUS 
events) 
PDD Database 
& SHELDUS* 
Local 
disaster 
training 
% population in 
communities with 
Citizen Corps 
program 
% 2000 2010 
(#s of CERTs) / 
(pop size) 
US Census & 
Citizen Corps 
Council 
Performance 
regimes-state 
capital 
proximity of 
county seat to seat 
capital 
miles 2000 2010 
measures 
straight line 
distance from 
county seat to 
state capital** 
Tiger/Line & 
National Atlas 
Performance 
regimes-
nearest metro 
area 
proximity of 
county seat to 
nearest county 
seat within 
Metropolitan 
Statistical Area 
(MSA) 
miles 2000 2010 
measures 
straight line 
distance from 
county seat to 
nearest MSA** 
Tiger/Line & 
National Atlas 
Population 
stability 
population change 
over previous 
five-year-period 
% 
1995-
2000 
2005-
2010 
% of population 
change in 5-yr 
period** 
US Census & 
Current 
Population 
Estimates 
Nuclear 
plant accident 
planning 
% population 
within 10 miles of 
nuclear power 
plant 
% 2000 2010 
(pop within 10 
mi of nuclear 
plant) / (county 
pop size) 
US Census & 
Nuclear Power 
Plant Database 
Crop 
insurance 
coverage 
crop insurance 
policies per 
square mi 
% 2000 2010 
(#s of crop 
insurance) / 
(land coverage) 
Tiger/Line & 
Farm Subsidies 
*SHELDUS stands for Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States  
** The normalized values were inverted before the min-max standardization scheme can 
be applied 
 
Mitigation planning and policies have demonstrable and measurable benefits to 
individuals and communities at large (Berke and Godschalk et al. 2009; McDaniels et al. 
2015). In addition, a higher degree of integration of emergency management activities, 
local disaster training, and nuclear accident planning can enhance disaster preparedness 
in localities, allowing for a more effective deployment of resources during times of crisis 
(Murphy 2007; Ansell et al. 2010; Simonovich and Sharabi 2013). Flood insurance and 
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crop insurance coverage can reduce the burden on individuals in the post-disaster period 
along with incentivizing communities to implement disaster risk reduction initiatives to 
minimize losses to property and livelihoods (Cheong 2011; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2012). 
Another aspect of resilience is disaster aid experience, which represents institutional 
knowledge in terms of accessing the bureaucratic structure to obtain aid and resources 
pertaining to disaster response and recovery. Finally, population stability is important to 
resilience because rapid population changes can affect the coping capability of a system. 
Unexpected population growth means that critical services might not be able to keep pace 
while population decline can contribute to decrease in tax base and municipal budgets, 
placing more pressure on existing institutions (Sherrieb et al. 2010). Analysis of how 
each of these indicators change over time contribute to better understanding of the 
process of building resilience, which can be influenced by various spatial and temporal 
factors.  
3.3 Study Area 
The utility of resilience metrics and indicators can be better understood through a 
place-based application (Berkes and Ross 2013). For this research, Hancock, Harrison 
and Jackson counties were selected for analysis (Figure 3.1). This thesis focuses on the 
coastal counties of Mississippi because the coastal area suffered from intense winds, 
storm surge and flooding from Hurricane Katrina, which displaced tens of thousands of 
people from their homes (Frey and Singer 2006). In general, Hurricane Katrina is by far 
the costliest tropical cyclones to hit the U.S., causing more than $108 billion in property 
damage mainly in Mississippi and Louisiana (Blake et al. 2011).  
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Winds of 135 mph and a storm surge of 32 feet wiped out casinos, businesses, 
parks, multimillion dollar homes and other physical structures along the affected 
Mississippi coast (Steven-Picou and Hudson 2010). In East Biloxi, housing of low-
income residents was destroyed, rendering many homeless (Cutter et al. 2014a). Major 
critical lifelines were lost, businesses closed, and communities were displaced. In 
addition to the loss of life and property, coastal ecosystems were heavily impacted, 
experiencing saltwater intrusion in wetlands, erosion of barrier islands (Evans-Cowley 
and Gough 2008) and widespread damage to forest ecosystems (Kupfer et al. 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of coastal counties in Mississippi.  
At present, the Mississippi coast is home to about 13% of the state’s population 
and many important industries. The 2010 U.S. Census data shows that Harrison County, 
which includes the Biloxi-Gulfport metropolitan area, is the most populated (187,000) of 
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the three coastal counties followed by Jackson County (140,00) and Hancock County 
(43,900).  These counties are home to numerous industries including gambling, 
shrimping and fishing, tourism, oil and gas extraction, shipbuilding, defense and 
aerospace (NOAA 2015). In addition, the coast is host to many busy docks and ports, 
including the Port of Gulfport, one of the busiest ports in the U.S. Gulf region (NOAA 
2015).  The Mississippi coastal counties and their strategic locations play a vital role in 
the state’s economy. Their geographical location along with active utilization and 
exploitation of coastal resources and ecosystems has also made this area more vulnerable 
to the destructive forces of natural hazards such as flooding, frequent hurricanes, and 
storm surges (Day et al. 2007). 
3.4 Summary 
The fundamental characteristic of resilience is the ability to persist and withstand 
shock after a disturbance as well as carry out adaptive learning to be more prepared for 
the next event. The coast of Mississippi is situated in a high-hazard area for hurricanes 
and storm surges.  As such, it represents an ideal location for examining and monitoring 
resilience at a finer scale.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR QUESTION #1 
4.1 Methodology 
Q1: How has the institutional resilience for the Mississippi Gulf Coast, 
conceptualized as BRIC indicators, changed in the setting of pre- and post-
Katrina contexts? 
To answer research question #1, the institutional resilience (IR) sub-index was 
replicated for the state of Mississippi at the county level for years 2000 and 2010. The 
ten-year-period between 2000 and 2010 is sufficient for analysis of change resilience 
metrics. The data for the index were gathered, transformed, normalized, and standardized 
according to the methodology provided in Cutter et al (2014b). Instead of scaling the 
institutional resilience metrics at the national scale for 3,108 U.S. counties as seen in the 
work of Cutter et al. 2014b, these IR were scaled for eighty-two counties in Mississippi.  
This process allowed for intra-county comparison within the State of Mississippi. 
Theoretically, a county in Mississippi will have more in common with other counties in 
Mississippi than with counties in Minnesota or Virginia, given that mitigation activities 
devolve from the federal level to states and their local communities (FEMA 2013).  
The IR composite score for each county ranges from 0 to 10, with the higher score 
indicating more resilience. The individual indicator values range from 0 to 1, with unity 
indicating the most resilient condition. In the case of four indicators, the absolute values 
were inverted to match theoretical orientation. They consist of jurisdictional coordination, 
performance regime-proximity of county seat from state capital, performance
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regime-proximity of county seat from the nearest metropolitan area, and population 
stability. For instance, the smaller the value for jurisdictional coordination, the more 
integrated the governance structure. Similarly, smaller distances from each county seat to 
the capital and the nearest metropolitan statistical area indicates increased resilience due 
to proximity to resources. In addition, smaller changes in population within the five-year-
period contribute to resilience because the counties are less likely to experience 
unexpected strains on institutional resources from new arrivals. 
First, the IR scores were mapped because the visualization of resilience scores can 
provide a comparative overview of where improvements are most needed. Next, paired 
difference of means tests (alpha of 0.05) was applied to determine whether the BRIC 
scores aggregated at the state scale have significantly changed over the ten-year-period. 
Further, to illustrate that scale matters, different combination of IR scores at the national 
scale and the state scale for 2000 and 2010 were used as pairs in the statistical analysis.  
Second, given that the nonparametric distribution of each IR indicator, the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, an alternative to the paired different of means test, was 
applied to the standardized values to determine which IR indicators had significantly 
changed from 2000 to 2010 at Mississippi scale. Drivers of institutional resilience at the 
state scale refer to variables of the index that experience statistically significant change 
(alpha of 0.05) longitudinally. In the case of the tri-county study area, drivers of 
institutional resilience are determined by the significant change in rank and absolute 
values from 2000 and 2010. In addition, the absolute values of each indicator were 
utilized to explain and contextualize the changes in resilience aspects for both the state of 
Mississippi and the study area. 
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4.2 Visualization of Temporal Change in Institutional Resilience for Mississippi 
The maps in Figure 4.1 illustrate that institutional resilience for Mississippi 
counties has changed spatially over ten years. The northern part of the Mississippi tends 
to have lower scores than the southern part at both times. In 2000, the most resilient 
counties were Quitman, Grenada, Leflore, Washington, Warren, Hinds and Harrison. In 
2010, this spatial distribution shifted towards the coastal area, with Lawrence, Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson and their neighboring counties having the highest resilient scores. 
By contrast, the spatial pattern for least resilient counties also changed. In 2000, the least 
resilient counties were located in northeastern part of the state including Union, 
Tishomingo, Itawamba and Yalobusha. By 2010, these counties were replaced by 
Benton, Sharkey and Choctaw. Moreover, many other counties experienced a change in 
ranking. For example, the resilience score for De Soto County shifted from relatively low 
in 2000 to relatively high in 2010. A contrasting example is Washington County, whose 
score of high resilience in 2000 shifted to medium resilience in 2010. 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the scores of the most and least resilient counties in 
2000 and 2010 from Figure 4.1. The standardized values of each indicator are also 
shown. For 2000, the difference between the highest and the lowest resilience score was 
2.41 while for 2010, it was 3.04. The most resilient counties in 2000 had high values in 
the areas of jurisdiction coordination and population stability. In comparison, the most 
resilient counties in 2010 were also highly ranked in terms integrated government 
coordination as well as urbanization. The least resilient counties ranked high only in one 
or two aspects and very low in others. Furthermore, indicators such as disaster training 
and nuclear planning in general contributed little value to institutional resilience.  
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Figure 4.1: BRIC institutional resilience scores for eighty-two counties in Mississippi in 2000 and 2010 (aggregated at the state scale). 
3
0
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Table 4.1: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for Mississippi counties with the highest 
and lowest rankings in 2000, aggregated at state scale (n=82). 
 
Rank County 
IR  
Score 
2000 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coordination 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Pop 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Most resilient 
1 Leflore 4.66 0.73 0.47 0.77 0.19 0.00 0.62 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.68 
2 Washington 4.61 0.67 0.45 0.85 0.37 0.00 0.59 0.29 0.83 0.00 0.55 
3 Claiborne 4.53 0.00 0.07 0.84 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.05 
4 Harrison 4.47 0.54 0.57 0.97 0.25 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 
5 Quitman 4.44 0.65 0.12 0.06 0.68 0.00 0.36 0.62 0.95 0.00 1.00 
Least resilient 
78 Benton 2.47 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.81 0.99 0.00 0.12 
79 Tishomingo 2.46 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.85 0.00 0.07 
80 Itawamba 2.45 0.05 0.01 0.78 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.37 0.80 0.00 0.11 
81 Union 2.43 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.62 0.65 0.00 0.18 
82 Yalobusha 2.25 0.00 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.80 0.00 0.11 
3
1
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Table 4.2: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for Mississippi counties with the 
highest and lowest rankings in 2010, aggregated at state scale (n=82). 
 
Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2010 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coordination 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Pop 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Most resilient 
1 Hancock 5.30 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.37 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 
2 Jackson 4.55 0.32 0.70 0.98 0.41 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.90 0.00 0.01 
3 Harrison 4.38 0.35 0.54 0.99 0.33 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
4 George 4.37 0.18 0.04 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.77 0.00 0.05 
5 Lawrence 4.16 0.02 0.02 0.85 0.17 0.79 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.00 0.02 
Least resilient 
78 Montgomery 2.41 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.03 0.00 0.62 0.21 0.71 0.00 0.13 
79 Oktibbeha 2.39 0.03 0.04 0.94 0.28 0.00 0.49 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.03 
80 Benton 2.35 0.01 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.81 0.58 0.00 0.14 
81 Choctaw 2.31 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.23 0.00 0.60 0.14 0.59 0.00 0.02 
82 Sharkey 2.26 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.76 0.36 0.33 0.00 0.52 
3
2
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The result from a paired difference of means test suggests that there is no 
statistically difference between the BRIC IR scores in 2000 and 2010 at the Mississippi 
scale (Table 4.3). Although the changes are not statistically significant, one must keep in 
mind that institutional resilience for each county is a composite score, which is calculated 
by summing the standardized values of all ten indicators. These values of any particular 
indicator have increased or decreased over the ten-year-period.  
Table 4.3: Paired difference of means test result comparing BRIC IR scores (aggregated at 
state scale) in 2000 and 2010 
Pair t-statistic 
p-value 
(p < 0.05) 
State BRIC IR Scores 2000 
State BRIC IR Scores 2010 
-1.114 .269 
 
4.2.1 Scaling Matters: Aggregation at the National Scale versus State Scale 
 The replicated BRIC IR scores for Mississippi in this study were scaled within the 
eighty-two counties. Paired difference of means tests (Table 4.4) suggest the scores 
scaled at the national scale for Mississippi are statistically different than the scores scale 
statewide in both 2000 and 2010. For example, in 2010, Hancock County had an IR score 
of 5.30 at the state scale as compared to a score of 4.48 at the national scale (see Table 
4.5 and Table 4.6). At the Mississippi scale, Hancock County is being compared against 
eighty-one other counties in Mississippi, while at the national scale, it is compared 
against 3,107 other counties in the U.S. While the paired difference of means test in 
Table 3.2 indicates that there is no statistical significant difference between the IR scores 
for Mississippi from 2000 to 2010, the IR scores at the national scale are statistically 
different from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4.4). These statistical results illustrate that spatial 
scale has a considerable influence on the institutional resilience scores. It is important to 
consider the scaling factor and comparison units when the index is being replicated. More 
 34 
details regarding the significance of scaling are discussed in the case study section of 
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties.  
Table 4.4: Paired difference of means test comparing Mississippi IR scores aggregated at 
the national scale and Mississippi IR scores aggregated at state scale in 2000 and 2010. 
 
Pair t-statistic 
p-value  
(p < 0.05) 
National BRIC IR Scores 2000 
State BRIC IR Scores 2000 
12.705 .000 
National BRIC IR Scores 2010 
State BRIC IR Scores 2010 
10.226 .000 
National BRIC IR Scores 2000 
National BRIC IR Scores 2010 
-7.501 .000 
 
4.3 Case Study: BRIC Institutional Resilience for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
Counties  
 
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties were utilized in as a case study to 
compare whether the drivers of institutional resilience for the Mississippi Coast were 
different than the drivers for the entire state. Table 4.5 contains the BRIC IR scores for 
the three coastal counties aggregated at the state scale, showing that that their IR scores 
and rankings have changed from 2000 to 2010. Hancock County ranked eighth out of 
eighty-two counties in 2000 and first in 2010, moving from 3.96 to 5.30. Similarly, 
Jackson County has the largest jump in ranking, moving from tenth place in 2000 to 
second place in 2010, with its score changing from 3.88 to 4.55. Harrison County moved 
from fourth place in 2000 to third place in 2010, although the score decreased slightly 
from 4.47 to 4.38. 
In 2000, the three counties ranked high in terms of urbanization and flood 
insurance coverage. They ranked on the low end in several categories including disaster 
aid experience, performance regime-proximity of county seat to state capital, population 
stability, and crop insurance coverage. Since there was no Community Emergency 
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Response Team (CERT) or nuclear plant in Hancock, Harrison and Jackson, the nuclear 
plant accident planning and local disaster training indicators are not applicable to these 
counties. In 2010, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson ranked in the top three counties in 
terms of mitigation spending and flood insurance coverage and on the bottom for crop 
insurance coverage. Jackson and Hancock County, who respectively ranked eighteenth 
and twenty-first in mitigation spending per capita in 2000, moved to first and second 
place in 2010. In addition, the ranks of these three counties in the disaster aid experience 
and population stability have relatively improved. The two performance regime 
indicators are constant in values for 2000 and 2010, and as such, there was no change in 
rank.  
At the national scale (see Table 4.6), Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties 
have moved up in ranks from 2000 to 2010, and their BRIC IR scores have also increased 
over time. In 2000, Hancock County ranked 1109th out of 3,108 counties. In 2010, it 
ranked 124th of out of 3,108 counties. Similarly, Harrison County moved from 994th place 
in 2000 to 610th place in 2010, and Jackson County moved from 1385th place in in 2000 
to 397th place in 2010. In terms of percentiles, at the national scale, Hancock and 
Harrison counties ranked in the 70th percentile with Jackson County in the 50th percentile 
in 2000. By 2010, Hancock County was in the 90th percentile while Harrison and Jackson 
were in the 80th percentile. By comparison, at the state scale Hancock, Harrison and 
Jackson counties ranked in the 90th percentile in both 2000 and 2010.  
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Table 4.5: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties in 2000 and 2010, with state ranking in parentheses (out of 82 counties). 
 
Rank County 
IR 
State 
Score 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coordination 
 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Pop 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
BRIC IR 2000 
8 Hancock 3.96 0.01 (21) 1.00 (1) 0.76 (44) 0.38 (26) 0.00 (n/a) 0.31 (66) 1.00 (1) 0.50 (78) 0.00 (n/a) 0.00 (76) 
4 Harrison 4.47 0.54 (5) 0.57 (3) 0.97 (2) 0.25 (49) 0.00 (n/a) 0.30 (67) 1.00 (1) 0.84 (44) 0.00 (n/a) 0.00 (79) 
10 Jackson 3.88 0.02 (18) 0.53 (4) 0.96 (4) 0.27 (43) 0.00 (n/a) 0.22 (72) 1.00 (1) 0.86 (40) 0.00 (n/a) 0.01 (58) 
BRIC IR 2010 
1 Hancock 5.30 1.00 (1) 1.00 (1) 0.84 (46) 0.37 (11) 0.00 (n/a) 0.31 (66) 1.00 (1) 0.78 (50) 0.00 (n/a) 0.00 (78) 
3 Harrison 4.38 0.35 (3) 0.54 (3) 0.99 (3) 0.33 (14) 0.00 (n/a) 0.30 (67) 1.00 (1) 0.87 (34) 0.00 (n/a) 0.00 (77) 
2 Jackson 4.55 0.32 (2) 0.70 (2) 0.98 (5) 0.41 (9) 0.00 (n/a) 0.22 (72) 1.00 (1) 0.90 (29) 0.00 (n/a) 0.01 (56) 
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Table 4.6: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional Resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties in 2000 and 2010, with national ranking in parentheses (out of 3,108 counties). 
 
Rank County 
IR 
National 
Score 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coordination 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
BRIC IR 2000            
1109 Hancock 4.03 
0.00 
(1027) 
0.29 
(58) 
0.99 
(1138) 
0.22 
(972) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.71 
(2219) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.81 
(2838) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.00 
(2706) 
994 Harrison 4.06 
0.08 
(162) 
0.17 
(89) 
1.00 
(326) 
0.16 
(1423) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.71 
(2236) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.94 
(1608) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.00 
(2729) 
1385 Jackson 3.96 
0.00 
(951) 
0.15 
(91) 
1.00 
(342) 
0.17 
(1354) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.68 
(2406) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.95 
(1421) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.00 
(2377) 
BRIC IR 2010            
124 Hancock 4.48 
0.23 
(27) 
0.54 
(18) 
0.99 
(1243) 
0.10 
(1221) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.71 
(2219) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.91 
(2188) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.00 
(2764) 
610 Harrison 4.11 
0.08 
(84) 
0.29 
(59) 
1.00 
(268) 
0.09 
(1330) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.71 
(2236) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.95 
(1540) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.00 
(2280) 
397 Jackson 4.20 
0.07 
(97) 
0.38 
(38) 
1.00 
(316) 
0.11 
(1117) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.68 
(2406) 
1.00 
(1) 
0.96 
(1292) 
0.00 
(n/a) 
0.01 
(2718) 
3
7
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For comparison, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 break down the state and national 
ranking by individual indicators in year 2000 and 2010. These rankings clarify where 
each county ranked statewide and nationally in terms of mitigation spending, flood 
insurance coverage, government coordination, disaster aid experience, local disaster 
training, performance regimes, population stability, crop insurance coverage and nuclear 
accident planning. For example, in 2000, Hancock ranked first in the state in the flood 
insurance coverage category with an indicator score of 1.00. At the national scale, 
although the absolute value for flood insurance policy per housing unit remained the 
same, Hancock County ranked 58th out of 3,108 counties with an indicator score of 0.29. 
Such discrepancies between the national and state scale demonstrate that ranking can be 
interpreted differently depending on the scaling. As noted earlier, the spatial scale is a 
crucial factor to consider in replication of an index as well in interpretation of its metrics 
and indicators. 
4.4 Examination of Institutional Resilience Indicators and Metrics for Mississippi 
and Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were performed on the all the institutional 
indicators to determine whether the changes in rank from 2000 to 2010 are statistically 
significant for the state of Mississippi. Due to the low number of cases in the tri-county 
study area, this test cannot be used to determine statistical significance in Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson counties. The results are listed in Table 4.7, which reveal that rank 
changes are statistically significant for several indicators such as mitigation spending, 
flood insurance coverage, jurisdictional coordination, disaster aid experience, and crop 
insurance coverage. Meanwhile, changes in local disaster training, population stability 
and nuclear accident planning are not significant. In the case of the performance regimes, 
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their values remain constant in the BRIC 2000 and 2010 and as such, no change could be 
measured. Moreover, there was no data for Mississippi in 2000 in the local disaster 
training category. As a result, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was not applied for this 
indicator.  
Table 4.7: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test results comparing change in values of each 
indicator from 2000 to 2010 for the State of Mississippi (n=82). 
 
Indicators 
Wilcoxon 
(p < 0.05) 
Mitigation spending 0.000 
Flood insurance coverage 0.000 
Jurisdictional coordination 0.000 
Disaster aid experience 0.000 
Performance regimes-state capital 1.000 
Performance regimes-nearest metro area 1.000 
Population stability 0.076 
Nuclear plant accident planning 0.655 
Crop insurance coverage 0.048 
 
4.4.1 Mitigation Spending: State of Mississippi 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicates that the mitigation spending in 2000 is 
statistically different from 2010 (see Table 4.7). In general, the majority of counties in 
Mississippi experienced significant increases in mitigation funding from 2000 to 2010. 
Many counties had zero in mitigation spending in 2000, with only thirty-seven counties 
having received mitigation funding between 1991 and 2000. By 2010, majority of 
counties had received post-disaster mitigation funding from the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP). A close examination of the absolute values of counties with highest 
mitigation spending in 2000 and 2010 indicate some discrepancies between temporal 
contexts in terms of longitudinal assessment. For instance, Grenada County ranked first 
in hazard mitigation spending with $16.20 per capita in 2000 and Hancock County in 
2010 with $85.10 per capita (Table 4.8 and Table 4.9). This difference in highest 
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mitigation spending per capita from 2000 to 2010 reveals two important points: 1) 
Mitigation spending in Mississippi has increased systematically from 2000 to 2010 and 2) 
In order to understand the significance of the rank changes, researchers and practitioners 
like must examine both the absolute and standardized (ranked) data.   
Table 4.8: Mississippi counties with the highest mitigation spending per capita in 2000. 
 
Rank County 
Mitigation 
per capita  
($) 
2000 
Population 
Grants Received 
($) 
#s of 
Grants 
1 Grenada 16.21 23,263 2,978,290 1 
2 Leflore 11.75 37,947 3,521,184 5 
3 Washington 10.78 62,977 5,364,533 5 
4 Quitman 10.51 10,117 839,624 3 
5 Harrison 8.73 189,601 13,075,743 16 
 
Table 4.9: Mississippi counties with the highest and lowest mitigation spending per capita 
in 2010. 
 
Rank County 
Mitigation 
per capita 
($) 
2010 
Population 
Grants Received 
($) 
#s of 
Grants 
1 Hancock 85.10 43,929 37,381,916 26 
2 Stone 68.28 17,786 12,145,112 9 
3 Wayne 40.69 20,747 8,442,938 6 
4 Harrison 30.18 187,105 56,472,159 41 
5 Jackson 27.44 139,668 38,333,603 32 
…      
78 Calhoun 0.27 14,962 39,815 2 
79 Issaquena 0 1,406 0 0 
80 Itawamba 0 23,401 0 0 
81 Marshall 0 37,144 0 0 
82 Sharkey 0 4,916 0 0 
 
Given that the standardized data represents mitigation funding per capita, it does 
not capture the disparity between more populous counties and less populous counties. For 
example, in 2000, although Grenada County had the highest mitigation spending per 
capita, Harrison County received the most mitigation grants, taking in about $13 million 
for sixteen projects; Grenada only received $3 million for one project. The reason that 
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Harrison County ranks lower in terms of mitigation spending is because it has a much 
larger population (189,601) as compared to Grenada (23,263) and the values were 
standardized by population. Such discrepancies can also be observed in the 2010 data in 
which Wayne County ranked higher than Harrison County in terms of mitigation 
spending per capita; however, Harrison County had nine times the population of Wayne 
County and seven times the amount of grants received.  
The shift in mitigation spending concentration can be attributed to Hurricane 
Katrina and the affected geographical area. In 2000, the state of Mississippi and its 
counties had ninety-eight projects funded by the HMGP. Funding from HMGP can only 
be acquired in the post-disaster context in which a disaster has been declared by the 
federal government. Between 1991 and 2000, Mississippi had several federally declared 
disasters including severe storms, ice storms, flooding, tornadoes, and hurricanes. Out of 
ninety-eight grants, twenty-six were linked to a severe winter event in 1994, and thirty-
three to Hurricane George, which impacted many counties in 1998. In comparison, 
between 2001 and 2010, the state and its counties received 463 HMGP grants, about 74% 
(341 grants) of which were related to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  
4.4.1.1 Mitigation Spending: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties  
Mitigation spending dramatically increased for all three coastal counties from 
2000 to 2010. This reflects the overall trend at the state scale. For example, Hancock 
County had only $0.31 mitigation spending per capita in BRIC IR 2000 (Table 4.10). In 
2010, this value increased to $85.10 per capita. Similarly, Harrison and Jackson also 
experienced increase in mitigation funding, which influences the change in ranking. 
Hancock County came in first place in 2010, as compared its twenty-first place in 2000.  
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Harrison County shifted from fifth place to second place, even though contribution of 
mitigation spending to the overall IR score has dropped from 0.54 to 0.34. Certainly, the 
ranking shift in mitigation spending has an important role in the change in institutional 
resilience for the Mississippi Gulf Coast as well as having significant contribution to the 
overall BRIC IR scores in 2010. For example, change in ranking for Hancock County 
increases the standardized value from 0.01 in BRIC IR 2000 to 1.00 in BRIC 2010, 
adding 0.99 to the overall resilience score. In 2000, mitigation spending contributed to 
less than 0.1% of the IR score. In 2010, it made up for about 20% of the overall IR score. 
Table 4.10: Mitigation spending for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 2000 and 
2010. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
Mitigation per 
Capita 
($)  
Population 
Size 
Grant 
Received 
($) 
#s of 
Grants 
BRIC IR 2000 
21 Hancock 0.01 0.19 42,967 65,050 3 
5 Harrison 0.54 8.73 131,420 13,075,743 16 
18 Jackson 0.02 0.31 189,601 322,336 5 
BRIC IR 2010 
1 Hancock 1.00 85.10  43,929 37,381,916 26 
2 Harrison 0.35 30.18 187,105 56,472,159 41 
3 Jackson 0.32 32.45 139,668 38,333,603 32 
 
These increases in migration funding can be linked to Hurricane Katrina. Twenty-
three out of twenty-six grants for Hancock County in BRIC IR 2010 are directly related 
to Katrina, thirty-four out forty-one for Harrison County, and twenty-two out of thirty-
two for Jackson County. In the pre-Katrina period, the three coastal counties received 
around $14 million in mitigation funding. In contrast, they received about $120 million in 
HMGP funding in the post-Katrina period.  
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4.4.2 Flood Insurance Coverage: State of Mississippi 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was utilized to compare flood insurance 
coverage in 2000 and 2010 (see Table 4.7). This test indicates that the there is a 
statistically significant difference between the 2000 and 2010. A closer look at the 
absolute values suggests that flood coverage has generally expanded for the entire state of 
Mississippi, but the percentage of coverage remains relatively low. Less than ten counties 
have flood coverage that exceeded ten percent. Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 contain details 
regarding the number of flood insurance policy and housing units of top five counties 
with the highest and lowest coverage. Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties are the 
top ranking counties in both the 2000 and 2010. These counties have to frequently deal 
with hazards relating to storm surge, flooding, and tropical cyclones. Benton, Franklin 
and Tippah County remain on the bottom in 2000 and 2010 with little to no expansion of 
flood coverage.  
Table 4.11: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest flood insurance coverage in 
2000. 
 
Rank County 
% of Housing Units 
 with Flood  
Insurance 
#s of NFIP 
Policies in 2000 
#s of Housing Units 
1 Hancock 22.42 4,724 21,072 
2 Issaquena 17.79 156 877 
3 Harrison 12.79 10,184 79,636 
4 Jackson 11.83 6,114 51,678 
5 Leflore 10.46 1,475 14,097 
…     
78 Tippah 0.05 5 8,868 
79 Jefferson 0.03 4 5891 
80 Franklin 0.24 1 4,119 
81 Benton 0 0 3,456 
82 Kemper 0 0 4,533 
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Table 4.12: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest flood insurance coverage in 
2010. 
 
Rank County 
% of Housing Units 
with Flood 
Insurance 
#s of NFIP 
Policies in 2010 
#s of Housing Units 
1 Hancock 48.34 9,550 19,756 
2 Jackson 34.05 19,748 57,995 
3 Harrison 26.01 20,880 80,275 
4 Issaquena 21.35 152 712 
5 Washington 11.87 2,645 22,276 
…     
78 Tippah 0.12 12 9,609 
79 Pontotoc 0.11 13 12,215 
80 Benton 0.10 4 4,073 
81 Jefferson Davis 0.08 5 5,909 
82 Franklin 0.02 1 4,170 
 
From 2000 to 2010, the number of NFIP policies increased with little change in 
the number of housing units for the majority of counties in Mississippi. This dramatic 
expansion of flood insurance coverage for the coastal area can be linked to Hurricane 
Katrina. The damages caused by the storm surges from Katrina revealed the risk and 
vulnerability of populated settlements along the coast resulting in increased participation 
in the NFIP Program (Michel-Kerjan 2010). 
4.4.2.1 Flood Insurance Coverage: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
Flood insurance policies double in the case of Hancock and Harrison counties 
while tripling for Jackson County from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4.13). This trend parallels 
the overall state trend in increased flood insurance expansion in the post-disaster period. 
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties are the top three counties with the highest flood 
insurance coverage in both BRIC IR 2000 and 2010. As mentioned earlier, the expansion 
in flood insurance coverage from 2000 to 2010 can be attributed to Hurricane Katrina, 
given the severity of the post-disaster impacts. Since the rankings for these three counties 
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remain relatively the same from 2000 to 2010, they do not significantly influence the 
change in the IR scores because the tri-coastal counties remain in the top three. The 
change in rank (or lack thereof) due to min-max scaling, however, obscures the fact that 
the number of flood insurance policies has increased dramatically in the study area. 
Furthermore, the flood insurance coverage indicator is one of the main contributors to the 
BRIC IR scores for the Mississippi coast. In BRIC IR 2000 and 2010, it makes up almost 
20% of the overall resilience score in Hancock County and 13% for Harrison County. 
Table 4.13: Flood insurance coverage for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 
2000 and 2010.  
 
Rank County BRIC IR 
values 
(standardized) 
% of Housing 
Units with Flood 
Insurance 
#s of NFIP 
Policy 
#s of 
Housing 
Units 
BRIC IR 2000 
1 Hancock 1.00 22.41838 4,724 21,072 
3 Harrison 0.57 12.78819 10,184 79,636 
4 Jackson 0.53 11.83095 6,114 51,678 
BRIC IR 2010 
1 Hancock 1.00 48.33974 9,550 19,756 
3 Harrison 0.54 26.01059 20,880 80275 
2 Jackson 0.70 34.05121 19,748 57,995 
 
4.4.3 Jurisdictional Coordination: State of Mississippi 
The results from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test indicate that there is a 
statistically significant difference from 2000 to 2010 regarding to jurisdictional 
coordination (see Table 4.7). The number of government and special districts (e.g. local 
administrative bodies) in Mississippi counties saw an overall decline from 2000 to 2010 
(Table 4.14 and Table 4.15). The data classification system from the U.S. Census might 
have changed over the years; some government and special districts that were counted in 
2000 are not included in 2007. Another reason is that some of the governments and 
special districts are eliminated or consolidated over the years due to budget constraints or 
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government reforms. For instance, Hinds County had a total of twenty government and 
special districts in 2000. By 2010, six of them had been eliminated or consolidated while 
the population size has decreased slightly. This can also be observed in the case of 
Bolivar County, which saw a decrease in government and special districts from a total of 
fifty in 2000 to forty-three in 2010. 
Table 4.14: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest jurisdictional coordination in 
2000. 
 
Rank County Govts per 10K people 
2000 
Population 
#s of Govts and Special 
Districts in 2000 
1 De Soto 1.49 107,199 16 
2 Jackson 1.45 131,420 19 
3 Lauderdale 1.41 78,161 11 
4 Harrison 1.37 189,601 26 
5 Hinds 0.88 250,800 22 
…     
78 Sharkey 16.72 6,580 11 
79 Quitman 15.81 10,117 16 
80 Benton 12.46 8,026 10 
81 Bolivar 12.31 40,633 50 
82 Calhoun 11.28 15,069 17 
 
Table 4.15: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest jurisdictional coordination in 
2010. 
 
Rank County 
Govts and Special 
Districts per 10K 
people 
2010 
Population 
#s of Govts and Special 
Districts in 2010 
1 Hinds 0.65 245,285 16 
2 Lauderdale 0.87 80261 7 
3 Harrison 0.91 187,105 17 
4 DeSoto 1.05 161,252 17 
5 Jackson 1.07 139,668 15 
…     
78 Benton 11.46 8,729 10 
79 Bolivar 12.59 34,145 43 
80 Issaquena 14.22 1,406 2 
81 Quitman 18.24 8,223 15 
82 Sharkey 22.38 4,916 11 
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The top five counties with the highest jurisdictional coordination in 2000 and 
2010 were Hinds, Lauderdale, Harrison, De Soto and Jackson County. Their low values 
in the Govt. Coordination column in Table 4.14 and 4.15 indicate they have less political 
fragmentation as compared to their counterparts. For example, in 2000, De Soto County 
had sixteen government and special districts that are responsible for a population of 
107,199 people. In contrast, Bolivar County had fifty government and special districts for 
a population of 40,633. As mentioned earlier in the background describing BRIC 
indicators, the fewer government and special districts that are present in a county, the 
higher the jurisdictional coordination. In addition, the counties that have the highest 
jurisdictional coordination values are also highly populous while the counties with the 
lowest are less populated.   
4.4.3.1 Jurisdictional Coordination: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties  
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties experienced a reduction in the number of 
government and special districts from 2000 to 2010, although their population sizes have 
changed only slightly (Table 4.16). As such, this decrease indicates that there is more 
coordination between different agencies and less political fragmentation, contributing to 
overall institutional resilience. As discussed earlier, the state of Mississippi overall 
experiences a decline in this category. The influence of this statewide trend can be seen in 
the jurisdictional coordination ranking of the counties which has remained relatively the 
constant from 2000 to 2010. It is not a significant driver of the change in institutional 
resilience. A high degree of jurisdictional coordination, however, is an important 
contributor to overall IR scores for these three coastal counties. 
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Table 4.16: Jurisdictional coordination for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 
2000 and 2010. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
 
Govts and Special 
Districts per 10K 
people 
Population 
Size 
#s Govts 
and Special 
Districts 
BRIC IR 2000 
44 Hancock 0.76 4.65 42,967 20 
2 Harrison 0.97 1.37 189,601 26 
4 Jackson 0.96 1.45 131,420 19 
BRIC IR 2010 
46 Hancock 0.84 4.10 43,929 18 
3 Harrison 0.99 0.91 187,105 17 
5 Jackson 0.98 1.07 139,668 15 
 
4.4.4 Disaster Aid Experience: State of Mississippi 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference from 2000 to 2010 regarding disaster aid experience (see Table 4.7). Table 
4.17 and Table 4.18 illustrate that the number of PDDs has not increased over time but 
the loss-causing events have significantly increased. As such, there is a clear trend of 
decline from 2000 to 2010 in terms of the ratio of PDD per loss event. Given that the 
ratio speaks to the ability of counties to acquire federal funding post-disaster, counties 
with lower ratios are less resilient than counties with higher ratios as they either receive 
less federal assistance and/or experience more loss-events from hazards. One important 
caveat to keep in mind is that PDDs and loss-causing events are numeric counts. A billion 
dollar PDD for a particular county, like Hurricane Katrina, is counted exactly the same as 
a one hundred million dollar PDD in another county. This formula of not distinguishing 
the dollar amount also applies to the loss-causing events. 
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Table 4.17: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest disaster aid experience in 2000. 
 
Rank County PDD per Loss Event in 2000 #s of PDDs #s of loss events 
1 Tate 0.50 10 20 
2 Franklin 0.47 8 17 
3 Wilkinson 0.47 7 15 
4 Quitman 0.36 5 14 
5 Tunica 0.33 5 15 
 …    
78 Sharkey 0.08 2 25 
79 Neshoba 0.06 3 48 
80 Lee 0.06 5 86 
81 Yalobusha 0.06 2 35 
82 Forrest 0.05 3 62 
 
Table 4.18 Mississippi counties with highest and lowest disaster aid experience in 2010. 
 
Rank County PDD per Loss Event in 2010 #s of PDD #s of loss event 
1 George 0.24 6 25 
2 Wilkinson 0.23 6 26 
3 Amite 0.21 7 33 
4 Green 0.14 5 36 
5 Wayne 0.14 5 36 
…     
78 Jones 0.02 4 173 
79 Rankin 0.02 5 218 
80 Leflore 0.02 2 99 
81 Montgomery 0.02 1 54 
82 De Soto 0.01 2 162 
 
4.4.4.1 Disaster Aid Experience: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 The disaster aid experience ranking for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties 
has moved up from 2000 to 2010, even though these counties have had more hazard 
related loss-events in 2010 (Table 4.19). This ranking reflects a statewide trend of 
increasing loss events while the number of PDDs remains relatively constant from 2000 
and 2010. The BRIC IR standardized values indicate that disaster aid experience is a 
driver of change in institutional resilience as well as a modest contributor to the overall 
BRIC IR scores. 
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Table 4.19: Disaster aid experience for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 2000 
and 2010. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
PDD per 
Loss Event 
#s of PDDs 
#s of loss 
events 
BRIC IR 2000 
26 Hancock 0.38 0.22 7 32 
49 Harrison 0.25 0.16 7 43 
43 Jackson 0.27 0.17 7 41 
BRIC IR 2010 
11 Hancock 0.37 0.10 6 62 
14 Harrison 0.33 0.09 6 69 
9 Jackson 0.41 0.11 7 66 
 
4.4.5 Local Disaster Training: State of Mississippi and Hancock, Harrison and 
Jackson Counties 
 
The indicator for Local Disaster Training is characterized by the percent of 
population covered by Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program, which 
is part of the Citizen Corps Program created by the Department of Homeland Security to 
help coordinate volunteer activities in emergency situations. The CERT Program 
educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact the local area 
and trains them basic disaster response skills. These emergency response skills include 
fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical operations 
(FEMA 2015c). Since it was created in the post-9/11 era, there are no data for Mississippi 
in 2000. In 2010, only four counties out of eighty-two Mississippi counties had CERT 
teams (Table 4.20). These are De Soto, Leflore, Lawrence and Panola counties. In the 
case of the tri-county study area, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties did not have 
any CERT in 2010.  
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Table 4.20: Mississippi counties with CERTs in 2010. 
 
County 
% of CERTs 
per capita 
#s of CERTs 
in 2010 
Population 
Size 
De Soto 0.19 300 161,252 
Leflore 0.16 52 32,317 
Lawrence 0.15 19 12,929 
Panola 0.00 2 34,707 
 
4.4.6 Performance Regimes: State of Mississippi  
This first performance regime indicator is calculated by measuring the distance, in 
miles, from the county seat to the state capital.  The data was acquired from the National 
Atlas. The same data is applied to both 2000 and 2010 under the assumption that the 
county seats have not changed. Cutter et al. (2014b) utilize ArcGIS to measure the 
straight-line distance from the county seats to the capital. The closer the county seat is to 
the capital, the more resilient the county itself. The capital of Mississippi is Jackson, 
which is located in Hinds County. The county seat of Rankin County is closer to Jackson 
than that of Hinds County. Given the distance measurements in Table 4.21, Union, Lee, 
Benton, Itawamba and Marshall are located the farthest from Jackson.  
Table 4.21: Performance regime (proximity of county seat from the state capital) for 
Mississippi counties. 
 
Rank County Distance from County Seat to Capital (miles) 
1 Rankin 11.22 
2 Hinds 13.53 
3 Madison 23.14 
4 Simpson 29.12 
5 Copiah 32.42 
…   
78 Union 164.52 
79 Lee 157.65 
80 Benton 157.12 
80 Itawamba 156.74 
82 Marshall 152.98 
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This second performance regime indicator is represented by the distance from the 
county seat to the nearest metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Similar to the first 
performance regime, the closer the county seat is to the nearest MSA, the more resilient 
the county itself. The same data is applied to 2000 and 2010, under the assumption that 
the distance between the county seat and MSA remains the same over ten years. Rankin, 
Hinds, Madison, Simpson and Copiah along with twelve other counties have their county 
seats located within MSAs, and as such, the distance represented Table 4.22 is zero. By 
contrast, Oktibbeha, Sunflower, Choctaw, Monroe, and Webster are counties located in 
the northern central region. They are predominantly rural, and their county seats are 
located further away from urban centers.  
Table 4.22: Performance regime (proximity of county seat from the nearest Metropolitan 
Statistical Area) for Mississippi counties. 
Rank County Distance from County Seat from MSA (miles) 
1 Rankin 0.00 
2 Hinds 0.00 
3 Madison 0.00 
4 Simpson 0.00 
5 Copiah 0.00 
…   
78 Oktibbeha 66.28 
79 Sunflower 67.09 
80 Choctaw 67.71 
80 Monroe 68.18 
82 Webster 79.12 
 
4.4.6.1 Performance Regimes: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties  
The performance regime indicators remain for the tri-county region constant in 
BRIC IR 2000 and 2010 (Table 4.23 and Table 4.24). As such, there is no change in 
ranking in these categories for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties. The standardized 
values of the second performance regime, proximity of county seat to the nearest 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area, however, contribute significantly to the overall IR in both 
2000 and 2010.  
Table 4.23: Performance regime (proximity of county seat to capital) for Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson counties. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
Distance from County 
Seat to Capital 
(miles) 
66 Hancock 0.31 145.34 
67 Harrison 0.31 146.64 
72 Jackson 0.22 161.82 
 
Table 4.24: Performance regime (proximity of county seat to nearest Metropolitan 
Statistical Area) for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
Distance from County 
Seat to MSA 
(miles) 
1 Hancock 1.00 0.00 
1 Harrison 1.00 0.00 
1 Jackson 1.00 0.00 
 
4.4.7 Nuclear Plant Accident Planning: State of Mississippi, Hancock, Harrison and 
Jackson Counties 
 
Only one county has nuclear accident planning because there is one nuclear plant 
in the entire state of Mississippi. It is located in Claiborne County. As such, this indicator 
is not as applicable to evaluate institutional resilience for Mississippi or the tri-coastal 
counties study area.  
4.4.8 Population Stability: State of Mississippi 
The results from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test suggests that the majority of 
counties in Mississippi have relatively stable populations in 2000 and 2010, indicating 
that there is not a statistically significant difference between the two sets of year (see 
Table 4.7). Less than twenty counties experienced significant population losses or gains, 
particularly in the double digits. In 2000, Calhoun, Leflore, Lauderdale, Marion and 
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Webster experience the least in terms of population change while Hancock, Issaquena, 
Rankin, Lamar and DeSoto have significant population growth (Table 4.25 and Table 
4.26). In the 2010, Attala, Walthall, Itawamba, Lowndes and Forest had relatively stable 
population size within the five-year-period. De Soto, Stone, and Lamar experienced 
significant population growth while Jefferson and Issaquena counties have significant 
population decline.  
Table 4.25: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest population stability in 2000. 
 
Rank County 
% of Population Change 
1995-2000 
1995 
Population 
2000 
Population 
1 Calhoun 0.09 15,056 15,069 
2 Leflore -0.09 37,981 37,947 
3 Lauderdale 0.11 78,076 78,161 
4 Marion 0.12 25,565 25,595 
5 Webster -0.13 10,307 10,294 
…     
78 Hancock 13.66 37,802 42,967 
79 Issaquena 13.98 1,995 2,274 
80 Rankin 15.96 99,451 115,327 
81 Lamar 16.09 33,655 39,070 
82 DeSoto 27.29 84,217 107,199 
 
Table 4.26: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest population stability in 2010. 
 
Rank County 
% of Population Change  
2005-2010 
2005 
Population 
2010 
Population 
1 Attala 0.06 19,552 19,564 
2 Walthall -0.11 15,460 15,443 
3 Itawamba 0.18 23,359 23,401 
4 Lowndes -0.19 59,895 59,779 
5 Forrest -0.21 75,095 74,934 
…     
78 DeSoto 17.70 137,004 161,252 
79 Jefferson -18.09 9,432 7,726 
80 Stone 19.67 14,862 17,786 
81 Lamar 24.75 44,616 55,658 
82 Issaquena -26.35 1,909 1,406 
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4.4.8.1 Population Stability: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties  
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties moved up in ranking in terms of 
population stability from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4.27). In 2000, Hancock County 
experienced significant population growth. In 2010, it has relatively small population 
decline. Similarly, Harrison County experienced modest population growth in 2000 and 
slight population decline in 2010. Meanwhile, Jackson County has a similar level of 
growth in both 2000 and 2010. As such, stable population size, as compared to dramatic 
population gain or loss, is a significant driver of change in institutional resilience and 
contributor to the overall BRIC IR scores for these three coastal counties.  
Table 4.27: Population stability for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 2000 and 
2010. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values 
(standardized) 
% of 
Population 
Change 
Population Size 
BRIC IR 2000  1995 2000 
78 Hancock 0.50 13.66 37,802 42,967 
44 Harrison 0.84 4.43 181,553 189,601 
40 Jackson 0.86 3.79 126,626 131,420 
BRIC IR 2010  2005 2010 
50 Hancock 0.78 -5.96 46,711 43,929 
34 Harrison 0.87 -3.46 193,810 187,105 
29 Jackson 0.90 2.74 135,940 139,668 
 
4.4.9 Crop Insurance Coverage: State of Mississippi 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicates that the level of crop insurance 
coverage is statistically and significantly different from 2000 to 2010 (see Table 4.7). 
Crop insurance policies are present in the northwestern and northern regions of 
Mississippi, which include Quitman, Sunflower, Leflore, Tallahatchie, Humphreys, 
Coahoma and Bolivar (Table 4.28 and Table 4.29). For these counties, crop insurance 
coverage has increased from 2000 to 2010. This expansion can be linked to increased 
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awareness and tightened regulations regarding crop protection against adverse weather 
hazards, disease or pests (Glauber et al. 2002). 
Table 4.28: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest crop insurance coverage in 
2000. 
 
Rank County 
% Crop Insurance 
Coverage in 2000 
#s Crop Policies 
Land Area 
(sq. miles) 
1 Quitman 2.28 923 404.84 
2 Sunflower 1.70 1182 693.79 
3 Tallahatchie 1.55 998 643.92 
4 Leflore 1.54 913 591.93 
5 Bolivar 1.49 1305 876.28 
…     
78 Newton 0.00 2 578.03 
79 Harrison 0.00 2 580.98 
80 Stone 0.00 1 445.37 
81 Lauderdale 0.00 1 703.51 
82 Jasper 0.00 0 676.00 
 
Table 4.29: Mississippi counties with highest and lowest crop insurance coverage in 
2010. 
 
Rank County 
% Crop Insurance 
Coverage in 2010 
#s Crop Policies 
Land Area 
(sq. miles) 
1 Quitman 2.86 1160 405.01 
2 Sunflower 2.15 1500 697.75 
3 Humphreys 2.13 893 418.49 
4 Coahoma 2.06 1138 552.44 
5 Leflore 1.79 1062 592.54 
…     
78 Hancock 0.00 1 473.75 
79 Neshoba 0.00 1 570.14 
80 Newton 0.00 1 578.10 
81 Lauderdale 0.00 1 703.63 
82 Jasper 0.00 0 676.24 
 
4.4.9.1 Crop Insurance Coverage: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
The ranking for crop insurance coverage has remained relatively the same from 
2000 to 2010 for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties (Table 4.30). There is no 
significant increase in the number of crop insurance policies over the ten-year-period. As 
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such, this indicator is not a significant driver or contributor of institutional resilience for 
the coastal area. 
Table 4.30: Crop insurance coverage for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties in 2000 
and 2010. 
 
Rank County 
BRIC IR values  
(standardized) 
% of Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
#s of Crop 
Insurance 
Policies 
Land Area 
(sq. miles) 
BRIC IR 2000 
76 Hancock 0.00 0.00 2 476.88 
79 Harrison 0.00 0.00 2 580.98 
58 Jackson 0.01 0.03 23 726.9 
BRIC IR 2010 
78 Hancock 0.00 0.00 1 473.75 
77 Harrison 0.00 0.00 2 573.99 
56 Jackson 0.01 0.04 28 722.75 
 
4.5 Summary 
There are five drivers of change in institutional resilience for the state of 
Mississippi and four for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties (Table 4.31). In the 
state of Mississippi, institutional resilience drivers include mitigation spending, flood 
insurance coverage, disaster aid experience, jurisdictional coordination and crop 
insurance coverage. The impacts of Hurricane Katrina can be observed in a statewide 
increase in mitigation funding, flood insurance participation and crop insurance coverage. 
For the three coastal counties, drivers are mitigation spending, flood insurance coverage, 
disaster aid experience and population stability.  
Table 4.31: Drivers of temporal change in institutional resilience for the State of 
Mississippi and for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties. 
 
Statewide Tri-County Coastal Counties 
1. Mitigation Spending 1. Mitigation Spending 
2. Flood Insurance Coverage 2. Flood Insurance Coverage 
3. Disaster Aid Experience  3. Disaster Aid Experience  
4. Jurisdictional Coordination 4. Population Stability 
5. Crop Insurance Coverage  
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The detailed analysis of the BRIC IR scores for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties shows that the change in rank in each institutional resilience indicator has a 
direct effect on the change in resilience score over time in many cases. Consequently, 
when a county moves up in terms of ranking in a particular IR category, the overall IR 
score will usually increase. In the case of flood insurance coverage, although the number 
of flood policies has dramatically increased in the study area, the ranking of Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson remains relatively the same from 2000 to 2010. As such, the min-
max scaling can obscure significant details. Driving indicators of institutional resilience 
for the coastal counties are slightly different than that of the whole state because they are 
more context-specific and applicable to the study area. This is an important point to note 
for decision makers who wish to use BRIC as a tool for deciding where to invest money 
or allocate resources. Local needs are different from state priorities. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR QUESTION #2 
 The quantitative analysis of the BRIC institutional resilience (IR) index shows 
that many IR indicators are directly related to mitigation planning. These indicators 
include mitigation spending flood insurance coverage, disaster aid experience, local 
disaster training, and nuclear plant accident planning. As such, qualitative analysis of 
state and local hazard mitigation plans can yield useful insights in regard to 
contextualizing the indicators.  
5.1 Hazard Mitigation Plans 
The central purpose of multi-hazard mitigation planning is to reduce and manage 
risk and hazards in the long-term. Multi-hazard mitigation plans are required for state and 
local governments by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 as well as serving as a 
condition for receiving federal funding and grants. The Act, which amended the Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, emphasizes that mitigation 
planning processes need to incorporate identification of hazards, risks, and 
vulnerabilities, prioritize mitigation actions, encourage partnership between citizens, 
local and state governments, and provide technical assistance for these efforts.   
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has multiple guidelines to 
aid states and local government in developing mitigation plans (FEMA 2008). Over the 
years, these guidelines have been thoroughly incorporated into mitigation plans. As a 
result, mitigation planning at federal, state and local level follows the same set of steps. 
The first step for local and state governments is to facilitate and conduct meetings with 
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diverse community groups. Community leaders can provide input on mitigation strategies 
and help evaluate the community’s capacities and needs. The second step is to complete a 
risk assessment of the potential impacts of hazards on the people, economy, and built and 
natural environments of the community. The objective is to identify and prioritize risk 
reduction strategies (FEMA 2008). 
The third step in the process is to build a mitigation strategy, which consists of 
mitigation goals, objectives and action items that the community will pursue. These are 
developed in consultation with subject matter experts, stakeholders and public surveys, as 
well as utilizing existing guides and resources. Collectively stakeholders identify eligible 
activities and projects that qualify for funding under the FEMA Hazard Mitigation 
Assistance (HMA). The final step is to commit to plan maintenance procedures, which 
are monitoring, evaluating and updating. Since mitigation plans are considered “living 
documents,” mitigation plans need to be evaluate and modify over time. According to the 
old guidelines, states were required to update their plans every three years and local 
governments every three years. As of 2015, current FEMA guidelines require both states 
and local governments to update their plans every five years (FEMA 2015b).  
5.2 Methodology  
Q2: Do state and local mitigation plans explain or indicate changes in 
institutional resilience for the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the setting of pre- 
and post-Katrina?  
Content analysis of state and local hazard mitigation plans was used to answer 
research question #2. The selected spatial unit of analysis is state and county-based 
hazard mitigation documents between the years of 2000 and 2010 to maintain the spatial 
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and temporal consistency with the BRIC analysis. The pre-Katrina hazard mitigation 
plans (HMPs) for Hancock, Harrison, Jackson and the state of Mississippi were acquired 
from the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency via public information request. 
These HMPs were the first official mitigation plans, as mandated by the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000, for Mississippi and the tri-coastal county study area. The post-
Katrina HMPs were the most current mitigation plans, which were found online on 
county and state websites or from directly contacting the local hazard mitigation offices.  
There were several updates between the first and most currents state and county 
HMPs (Table 5.1). The 2004 State HMP had been updated in 2007, 2010 and 2013. 
Hancock County updated its 2001 County HMP in 2006 and 2013. Harrison County 
updated its 2001 County HMP in 2005, 2008 and 2014. Lastly, Jackson County updated 
its 2005 County HMP in 2012. The most updated State and County HMPs were selected 
to represent post-Katrina HMPs because they can provide useful insights regarding the 
current mitigation practices and how these practices had evolved over time. In addition, 
these HMPs contained examples of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and how they 
had been incorporated into current planning goals and strategies.  
Table 5.1: State and local mitigation plans included in this study. 
 
 Year Plan Title 
State of 
Mississippi 
2004 State of Mississippi Standard Mitigation Plan 
2013 Mississippi State Hazard Mitigation Plan Update 
Hancock County 
2001 Hancock County Hazard Mitigation Plan 
2013 Hancock County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update 
Harrison County 
2001 Harrison County Mitigation Plan 
2014 Harrison County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Jackson County 
2005 Jackson County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan 
2012 Jackson County Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan 
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The qualitative data acquired from the content analysis process was explored in 
different ways. First, the indicators in the BRIC institutional sub-index were utilized as 
variables to construct a checklist, using the methodology in Frazier et al. (2013). The 
authors utilize the BRIC framework developed by Cutter et al. (2010) as a reference to 
review different disaster mitigation plans including post-disaster development plan, 
comprehensive emergency management plan, comprehensive plan, and local mitigation 
strategy plan. The BRIC resilience indicators were used to determine whether certain 
factors were referenced or highlighted in reviewed plans.  
Unlike Frazier et al. (2013), this checklist is a longitudinal assessment of hazard 
mitigation practices. It only included hazard mitigation plans and not emergency 
management plans, comprehensive plans, and post-disaster plans. The checklist was used 
to assess discussions in pre- and post-Katrina state and local hazard mitigation documents 
relating to the ten IR indicators. It recorded whether the IR indicators were present or 
absent in the pre- and post-Katrina HMPs. Second, an in-depth assessment of IR 
indicators was conducted to describe how they changed in the context of pre- and post-
Katrina.  
This section contains a comprehensive assessment of the institutional indicators 
that are found in either or both of the pre- and post-Katrina state and local HMPs. It 
documents the way these indicators are represented in the HMPs as well as the way their 
representations have changed over time. As such, documentation of any changes that 
were made afterward, taking the impacts of Katrina into account, provides clarifications 
and contextualization for the output metrics of BRIC IR indicators. 
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5.3 Checklist Construction and In-depth Analysis of State and Local Hazard 
Mitigation Plans  
 
Table 5.2 indicates that while certain IR indicators are ubiquitously present in all 
HMPs, others are noticeably missing. For instance, hazard mitigation, jurisdictional 
coordination, disaster aid experience and flood insurance coverage are present in both 
state and local hazard mitigation plans in the pre- and post-Katrina contexts.  By contrast, 
crop insurance coverage, nuclear accident planning (with exception of the pre-Katrina 
State HMP) and the two performance regimes are not found in any of the examined 
documents.  
 
Table 5.2: Checklist for state and county HMPs using BRIC institutional indicators. 
 
 Mississippi Hancock Harrison Jackson 
Institutional Resilience 2004 2013 2001 2013 2001 2014 2005 2012 
Mitigation spending x x x x x x x x 
Jurisdictional coordination x x - x - x x x 
Disaster aid experience x x partial x partial x x x 
Flood insurance coverage x x x x x x x x 
Local disaster training x - - - - x - - 
Population stability - x x x x x x x 
Crop insurance coverage - - - - - - - - 
Performance regimes- 
state capital 
- - - - - - - - 
Performance regimes-
nearest metro area 
- - - - - - - - 
Nuclear plant accident 
planning 
x - - - - - - - 
(x) present and (-) absent 
 
5.3.1 Mitigation Spending: State of Mississippi  
FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds all mitigation plans 
and their subsequent updates. The State hazard mitigation plan is developed and 
maintained by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). The HMGP 
provides grants to states and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation 
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after a major disaster declaration. About 15 percent of the post-disaster assistance goes to 
ward mitigation programs and comes at least a year after a disaster declaration. Projects 
that are funded by HMGP include but not limited to retrofitting critical facilities, building 
saferooms and storm shelters, eliminating repetitive flood loss structures and creating 
warning systems.  
According to the first HMP of the State of Mississippi, which was created in 
2004, the comprehensive planning process involves coordination, collaboration and 
consultation. The mitigation plan has to be constructed in accordance with FEMA 
Mitigation Planning Guidance. MEMA decides to work different research and planning 
teams for prioritized hazards, which include earthquake, flood, hurricane, tornado, dam 
and levee hazards, and winter storm. In addition, state emergency management 
representatives are obligated to seek inputs from federal and local agencies along with 
community groups and business organizations. MEMA also has to make sure their 
mitigation strategies are integrated with local plants and initiatives. Next, it conducts 
multi-hazard risk and vulnerability assessment for prioritized hazards in terms of loss 
modeling, potential loss estimates, and exposure of critical state facilities. Moreover, the 
MEMA is responsible for assessment of local capacities and provides funding and 
technical assistance to its local districts. Finally, since the hazard mitigation plan is 
considered a “living document,” MEMA must maintain its goals and objectives and 
update the plan every five years. The steps described here represent the basic outline of 
any mitigation frameworks for the state, county or municipal level. 
The latest HMP for the State of Mississippi was updated in 2013 by MEMA. The 
document shows that it has been completed with a high degree with public participation. 
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There are observable changes between the 2004 State HMP and the 2013 updated. For 
instance, the 2004 State plan divides Mississippi into ten planning and development 
districts, which were established by grouping counties into ten geographic clusters (e.g. 
north, northwest, southern, etc.). By contrast, the political structure discussed in the 2013 
HMP manages Mississippi counties by classifying them into nine different MEMA 
regions. Next, as required by FEMA, the prioritized hazards have grown to include 
wildfire. Meanwhile, severe weather and hurricanes and tropical storms are classified 
under the tropical cyclone category. Moreover, the hazard identification and risk 
assessment section shifts from using just probabilistic estimation to priority ranking 
methodology, or the Hazard Ranking Index, which takes into account multiple factors 
such as areas affected by hazards, health and safety consequences, property damage, 
environmental damage, and probability of future occurrence.  
The 2004 HMP document uses historical records of different hazards to model the 
worst-case-scenarios. In the 2013 HMP, given the severe degree of property losses and 
casualties caused by Hurricane Katrina, it was used as a baseline to estimate damages, 
displacement and exposure in tropical cyclone scenario modelling. Lastly, the 2013 HMP 
also includes social vulnerability assessment, as opposed to focusing only on structural 
vulnerability as in previous versions. Based on the Social Vulnerability Index, or SoVI, 
the plan identifies different socio-demographic and built environment variables to 
determine the state’s most socially vulnerable counties (Cutter et al. 2003). Over time, the 
state plan has been drastically improved in every single aspect due to increased learning 
experience, technological advances, and communications with its public and private 
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partners. In addition, the disaster experience from Hurricane Katrina contributes to 
increased awareness about the realizable impacts of environmental hazards.   
The notion of resilience can be seen throughout the 2013 state HMP. By contrast, 
the 2004 HMP did not have any reference mentioning resilience. Building and enhancing 
resilience is the central basis for the broad mission of the 2013 State Hazard Mitigation 
document. Most of its goals and objectives in the 2004 State HMP and 2013 HMP bear 
some resemblance in terms of techniques and strategies to increase public awareness, 
reduce risk, foster cooperation and collaboration among all levels of governments, non-
profit and private sectors, and strengthen local capacities.  
5.3.1.1 Mitigation Spending: Hancock County 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires counties to 
update their HMPs every five years. The first HMP for Hancock County was created in 
2001, and its latest version was updated in 2013. Moreover, unlike the 2000 version, the 
2013 HMP is a multijurisdictional plan, which was jointly prepared by Hancock County, 
the city of Diamondhead, and the unincorporated community of Pearlington. 
Multijurisdictional planning allows different localities and their respective county to 
create comprehensive approaches that cover multiple jurisdictions; the city of Bay St. 
Louis and Waveland have their own local HMPs. In addition, multijurisdictional planning 
will aid in terms of economics of scale by leveraging individual capabilities and sharing 
costs and resources. One of the tradeoffs of this type of planning is localities might have 
less control over the process as leadership become more centralized (FEMA 2000).  
When compared the 2001 and 2013 Hancock County HMPs, there are observable 
differences. First, the 2013 County HMP includes extensive vulnerability and capacity 
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assessments for localities that are covered under its jurisdiction, the city of Diamondhead 
and the unincorporated community of Pearlington. The plan also contains different 
hazard profiles and mitigation strategies specially tailored to these localities. Second, in 
2001 Hancock County was concerned both environmental and technological hazards, 
which included flooding, hurricanes, rail accident, traffic, terrorism, wildfires, tornadoes 
and severe heat. By 2013, most of the technological hazards were eliminated from the 
priority list and more natural hazards such as severe weathers, costal erosion, and climate 
change were added. Assessment of climate change is new and a recent federal 
requirement (Babcock 2013). The prioritized hazards as identified by the county are 
much different than that of the state.   
Third, similar to the latest State HMP, the 2013 HMP incorporates the impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina extensively throughout the document. Since the county and its 
localities have not fully recovered, any recovery and mitigation activities have to be able 
to handle the worst-case-scenario Katrina disaster. Fourth, the 2013 County HMP has 
incorporated different mechanisms to assess weakness and strengths in mitigation goals 
and actions, as compared to the lack of assessment in the first HMP. The 2013 county 
plan also recorded which actions were completed and recognize barriers to the 
incomplete ones.  Finally, in 2013, the county had also expanded its list of mitigation 
projects that are qualified for federal funding under HMGP. In addition to making 
improvements to public shelters and public warning systems, the county, as of 2013, 
applied for funding to establish fire breaks, retrofit individual structures to withstand 
hurricane force winds, and enforce land use and building code regulations.  
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5.3.1.2 Mitigation Spending: Harrison County 
 The first HMP for Harrison County was approved in 2001, and its latest version 
was updated in 2014.  Similar to Hancock County, the most updated version is a 
multijurisdictional mitigation plan, which covers planning for the county and the cities of 
Biloxi, D’Iberville, Gulfport, and Pass Christian. Consequently, the current county plan 
conducts vulnerability and capability assessments on multiple hazards, taking the 
localities under its jurisdiction into account. The list of prioritized hazards has expanded 
since 2001 to include solely environmental hazards such as extreme heat, wildfires, 
hailstorm, hurricane and tropical storms, severe weather, earthquake, tornado, windstorm, 
flood, coastal erosion, storm surge, wave action, and sea-level-rise and other effects 
associated with climate change. It chose excludes the technological or manmade hazards 
that were stated in the 2001 HMP such as railroad accident, terrorism and traffic 
accidents because these are not high-risk hazard in Harrison County.  
Second, similar to the other post-Katrina HMPs, the impacts of the Hurricane 
were incorporated throughout the document, particularly in the worst-case-scenario 
modeling and simulations. In addition, flood and storm surge maps were revised to show 
the extent and the magnitude of Katrina’s surge. Federal funding that was received post-
Katrina were used to enforce building code and land use regulations as well as increase 
construction of storm shelters and retrofit public structures. Third, Harrison County has 
adopted and applied the Hazard Ranking Index that was used to categorize and prioritize 
hazards for the State. Lastly, unlike the 2001 County HMP, the current version contains a 
comprehensive asset inventory (e.g. school, hospital, police station, fire station, etc.), 
which is usually lacking in many pre- and post-Katrina HMPs.  Overall, the pre- and 
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post-Katrina HMP for Harrison County are significantly different from each other in 
terms of management structure, prioritized hazard types, comprehensiveness of 
vulnerability and capability assessment, and the degrees of communication with 
community, non-profit and private groups.  
5.3.1.3 Mitigation Spending: Jackson County 
 Jackson County finalized its first hazard mitigation plan following the impact of 
Katrina, which was approved in November 2005. Although the planning process started 
in early 2003, many pertinent programs and files were destroyed in Hurricane Katrina in 
late August 2005. Consequently, the 2005 County HMP was not as comprehensive as its 
counterparts, resembling the first HMPs in Hancock and Harrison counties. Over time, 
the current county HMP shows significant improvement as compared to the first version. 
First, the 2012 version is a multijurisdictional mitigation plan, which covers Jackson 
County and the city of Gautier. The city of Moss Point, Ocean Springs and Pascagoula 
participated in the planning process in 2005, but chose to create separate hazard 
mitigation plans for 2012.  Second, the 2012 County HMP expands the list of prioritized 
hazards to include coastal erosion, drought, flood, hurricane and coastal storms, storm 
surge, severe weather, tornado, wildfires and sea-level-rise. These are ranked using 
probability of hazard occurrence instead of applying the State’s Hazard Ranking Index. 
Moreover, the vulnerability and capability assessment portion of Jackson County are not 
as comprehensive as compared to that of Hancock and Harrison counties. There are very 
few applications of HAZUS-MH loss modeling, and they are exclusively applied to storm 
surge and hurricane.  
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Third, the impacts of Hurricane Katrina are not incorporated into worst-case-
scenario. In addition, the current plan does not have a comprehensive list of critical 
facilities. A partial explanation for this deficiency in vulnerability and capability 
assessment is due to the fact that many important planning files were lost during the 
Hurricane, however, that was seven years ago. Furthermore, the plan does not contain a 
record of projects that were executed using funds from HMGP. Overall, the 2005 and the 
2012 County HMP are somewhat different from one another, but the 2012 version is not 
as comprehensive as the current HMPs of Hancock and Harrison counties.  
5.3.2 Jurisdictional Coordination: State of Mississippi 
 An indicator of jurisdictional coordination can be found in the second chapter of 
both the 2004 and 2013 State HMPs. This section of the documents record—as required 
by FEMA—every step of the planning process as well as the personnel that were 
involved. In 2004, the state planners coordinated with different specialized teams. The 
representatives came from other state governmental agencies, research universities, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Weather Service, U.S. Geological 
Survey and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Each team was responsible for a specific 
hazard type such as winter storm, earthquake or flood.  
By contrast, the 2013 State HMP was produced under the guidance of a 
centralized entity called the Hazard Mitigation Council. The Council, formed in 2007 
through an executive order by Governor Haley Barbour, is responsible for coordinating 
mitigation efforts between all levels of government, non-profit organizations, and the 
private sector. Members from cabinet level departments meet with mitigation planners, 
MEMA staff, FEMA program managers and specialists, local emergency managers, and 
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university researchers to set mitigation goals and objectives along with assisting with 
vulnerability and capacity assessments. In addition, there are additional meetings and 
summits during which MEMA personnel interact with the Mississippi Civil 
Defense/Emergency Management Association (MCDEMA) to integrate statewide 
planning initiatives with local efforts. They also work closely with professionals who are 
involved with public health officials, Emergency Medical Service, hospital, fire and law 
enforcement representatives, volunteer organizations, and local governmental agencies. 
Given the two documents, there are significant improvements in jurisdiction coordination 
as time went on. This can be partially attributed to lessons learned from Hurricane 
Katrina and/or increased in coordination and communication experience.  
5.3.2.1 Jurisdictional Coordination: Hancock County 
 The 2001 County HMP did not document any consultation activity between local 
planners and other agencies, hazard experts, non-profit, or private sectors. By contrast, 
evidence of jurisdictional coordination in the updated 2013 version is found in two 
aspects. First, the 2013 County HMP is a multijurisdictional plan which was produced 
jointly between the county, the city of Diamondhead, and the unincorporated community 
of Pearlington. This characteristic suggests that there are some elements pertaining to 
jurisdictional coordination when a county has a multijurisdictional hazard mitigation 
plan. Second, Chapter 3 of the 2013 County HMP details the planning process, which is 
the responsibility of the Hancock County Hazard Mitigation Committee. The Committee 
includes representatives from neighboring communities, local and regional agencies 
involved in development, business, academia, and private non-profit organizations.  The 
Committee is also tasked with increasing public involvement through open forums and 
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meetings. Given the current state of Hancock County, the presence of a centralized entity, 
which bears strong resemblance the State’s Hazard Mitigation Council, indicates that 
there has been improvements made to jurisdictional coordination.  
5.3.2.2 Jurisdictional Coordination: Harrison County 
 Harrison County’s 2001 HMP discusses its partnership with the county Civil 
Defense Agency and briefly mentions its coordination with outside agency personnel. 
The document mentioned different local representatives as liaisons during emergencies, 
but did not go into details about the extent of the relationship. In addition, it also pointed 
out that the Civil Defense agency is responsible for providing technical support and 
expertise to monitor flood and disaster warnings. Given these aspects, the 2001 County 
HMP did not capture enough information to indicate that there was effective 
jurisdictional coordination at the time. In the post-Katrina period, Harrison County 
recognizes that all information provided in earlier plans as it relates to hazard risks and 
vulnerabilities, capabilities, community goals and recommended mitigation actions need 
to be updated due to the effects of the storm. Consequently, the 2014 version is a product 
of the Local Hazard Mitigation Planning Council (LHMPC) and an outside consultant 
team, an engineering firm called Dewberry. The LHMPC invited new members and 
representatives from the American Red Cross, American Medical Responses, Harrison 
County, city of Biloxi, D’Iberville, Gulfport, Long Beach and Pass Christian, the 
Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport, other cabinet departments, utility companies and 
casino managers. Finally, the LHMPC held open forums and webinars as part of an 
outreach effort for community hazard mitigation practices and providing information to 
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the public. Over time, there are observable improvements made to jurisdictional 
coordination between the first mitigation plan and its current version. 
5.3.2.3 Jurisdictional Coordination: Jackson County 
 The 2005 Jackson County HMP briefly documents the collaboration between 
county officials, city personnel from Gautier and Moss Point, civil defense departments, 
zoning and planning council and other emergency service professionals. The details of 
these meetings were not extensive. Moving forward to 2012, the Local Hazard Mitigation 
Council, which includes emergency representatives from Jackson County and the city of 
Gautier, sought technical assistance from state agencies (e.g. MEMA, Department of 
Health, Marine Resources, Transportation, etc.), business and non-profit communities, 
city councils, county medical communities, and utility providers. They held several 
meetings to identify and prioritize hazards, conduct vulnerability and capacity 
assessments, as well as formulate mitigation goals and actions. In addition, the Council 
incorporated public inputs gathered from workshops and surveys into the planning 
process. Overall, the elements of jurisdictional coordination are also present in all current 
state and local hazard mitigation plans in the form of meetings between personnel from 
different level of governmental agencies, non-profit organizations and private sectors.  
5.3.3 Disaster Aid Experience: State of Mississippi 
  In the hazard assessment portion of the 2004 State HMP, it includes the data for 
PDDs and the number of loss-causing hazard events, which were acquired from FEMA 
and National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). The PDDs were reported for each hazard 
type as well as specified the name of the disaster declared counties. This data was also 
used to create a checklist to determine which counties are at the highest risk for certain 
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types of hazards. The loss data from NCDC was used to specify the type and the number 
of loss-causing events along with the amount in property and crop damage. In addition, 
NCDC data also contains information about fatalities that occurred during hazardous 
events. The PDDs and loss data are present in the vulnerability assessment portion of 
flood, hurricane, winter storm and tornado. By 2013, there are some alterations that were 
made to the loss reporting approach in mitigation planning.  
 The 2013 State HMP uses data from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses 
Database for the United States (SHELDUS) in addition to FEMA and NCDC data. 
SHELDUS data was only present in the tornado damage assessment and absent in other 
hazard assessments such as hurricane, flood and winter storm. The document cites that 
SHELDUS was utilized because its data can be adjusted for inflation, unlike NCDC data. 
Meanwhile, NDCD data was used to report property and crop damage and casualties for 
each MEMA region, and PDD data specified the amount of total public assistance, 
emergency work, and permanent work received by during each presidentially declared 
disaster. Moreover, NCDC data was used to report on losses during severe weather, 
extreme winter weather, flood, hurricane and tornado events. Losses and damages due to 
hazards like drought, dam and levee failure, earthquake and coastal erosion are either 
absent or reported by using other sources.  
5.3.3.1 Disaster Aid Experience: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
By using the metric of disaster aid experience as a proxy, it can be observed that 
Hancock and Harrison counties have partial reporting of losses in their pre- and post-
Katrina hazard mitigation plans. Only Jackson County’s HMP include Presidential 
Disaster Declaration reporting in its profiling of hazards. As well, none of the pre- and 
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post-Katrina county HMPs uses SHELDUS data, as they mostly rely on NCDC data for 
loss reporting.  
For Hancock County, NCDC data was used in both the 2001 and 2013 HMPs. 
The most recent version, however, has a more detailed account of damages and casualties 
for hazards like hurricanes, severe weather, flood, and coastal storms. In addition, PDD 
data, which was absent in the 2001 HMP, was used to report federally declared hurricane 
events. For Harrison County, the way losses are reported is similar that of Hancock 
County. The pre-Katrina 2001 County HMP only briefly covers losses caused by 
different hazards while the more updated version includes more details. As such, the 
2014 County HMP uses NCDC data to report the number of events and overall losses for 
severe weather, flood, tornado, hurricane, storm surge, and wave action. Moreover, PDD 
data was used to report for federally declared losses from hurricane and flood. Lastly, 
Jackson County has the only report that includes some information about federally 
declared disasters in its pre-Katrina HMP, most of which concerns hurricanes. In 
addition, the 2005 County HMP also contains detailed records of losses on tornado, 
hurricane, flood and coastal storm events. Its method of reporting losses was not altered 
in the updated 2012 version.  
5.3.4 Flood Insurance Coverage: State of Mississippi 
 For the State of Mississippi, NFIP coverage is an important component of 
capacity assessment. The state keeps detailed records of communities that are covered by 
NFIP and hopes to increase participation in years to come. In the 2004 State HMP, 
Mississippi reported that 273 out of 310 communities included Special Flood Hazard 
Areas (SFHA) or flood plain members of the NFIP. In addition, 19 of these 273 
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communities also participate in the Community Rating System (CRS). The CRS program 
incentivizes communities to engage in floodplain management activities that exceed the 
minimum NFIP requirements. In exchange, flood insurance premium rates are discounted 
based on the class rating of the community. By 2013, Mississippi had 330 communities 
participating in the NFIP and 29 in CRS. This expansion of NFIP participation can in part 
be attributed to damages caused by Hurricane Katrina as well as increased outreach and 
education about the program itself. According to NFIP loss statistics, the Gulf Coast 
counties had the highest flood losses in the period of 1978 to 2013. They are also the top 
three counties with the most repetitive and severe repetitive loss of structures, which 
continue to strain NFIP resources. As observed in the pre-Katrina and post-Katrina State 
HMPs, the discussion about NFIP is relatively similar in the two documents.  
5.3.4.1 Flood Insurance Coverage: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 Given that the Mississippi Gulf Coast area historically has the highest flood 
losses, it comes as no surprise that discussion regarding NFIP is present in all of the 
HMPs for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties. As of 2004, none of these counties 
participate in the CRS Program. The pre-Katrina HMPs for these counties did not 
perform detailed analysis of NFIP coverage as compared the post-Katrina County HMPs. 
For Hancock County 2013 HMP, NFIP is discussed in terms of flood mapping, structural 
elevation, floodplain ordinance and management, and CRS participation. In addition, the 
county tracks the repetitive and severe repetitive loss properties by mapping and record 
keeping, appropriately allocating resources and implementing loss-reduction strategies. 
With regard to CRS, Hancock County and the City of Diamondhead are not members. By 
contrast, the City of Bay St. Louis and Waveland both participate in the CRS with 
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respective ratings of seven (15% discount in SFHA and 5% in non-SFHA) and five (25% 
discount in SFHA and 10% in non-SFHA).  
  In the 2001 Harrison County HMP, NFIP was mentioned in the repetitive loss 
properties, which the county kept detailed records, and included a recommendation 
section relating to retrofitting structures. The document also notes the prospect of 
Harrison County joining the CRS program. By 2014, Harrison County is certified as 
Class 8 community, which receives 10% in premium reduction in SHFA and 5% in non-
SFHA. The CRS class rating for Harrison and Jackson communities fall into the average, 
with majority of nationwide communities attaining rating in Class 8 or 9 (Landry and Li).   
Similar to the 2013 Hancock County HMP, the most updated version for Harrison 
County points out that NFIP participation is crucial in capability assessment as well as in 
floodplain management, flood mapping, reduction of repetitive and severe repetitive loss 
structures, and enforcement of flood ordinance. In the case of Jackson County, the 2005 
County HMP only makes a brief mentioning of NFIP in regard to repetitive loss 
properties. In addition, one of goals of the plan was to attain better CRS rating for 
participating jurisdictions to indicate a lower flooding risk level. As of 2012, Jackson 
County, the City of Gautier, Ocean Springs and Pascagoula are participating members of 
the CRS system, with respective class ratings of nine, seven, seven and five. As for NFIP, 
the 2012 County HMP discusses flood insurance in similar terms as those of current 
Hancock and Harrison counties HMPs.  
5.3.5 Local Disaster Training: State of Mississippi 
 The 2004 State HMP records that as of 2005, there are a total of 74 CERT Teams 
in Mississippi with 1,037 participants, many that come from school districts, community 
 78 
colleges, community centers, medical centers, and community emergency services. 
Meanwhile, the most updated 2013 HMP has no mentioning of CERT. This information 
can be found the State’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan of 2012.  
5.3.5.1 Local Disaster Training: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 According the 2004 State HMP, no CERT was present in the Harrison, Hancock 
or Jackson County. As such, the pre-Katrina HMPs of the Gulf Coast counties have no 
mentioning of CERT. As for the current County HMP, the only reference to CERT was 
found in Harrison’s 2014 HMP as it discussed the need to expand CERT with little 
details.  
5.3.6 Population Stability: State of Mississippi 
 The 2004 State HMP did not take population stability into consideration. It only 
considered the total population in 2000 of each planning and development district but did 
not address how population growth or decline would affect the capability to cope with 
different hazard types. In contrast, the 2013 State HMP takes population growth or 
decline into account in terms of economic activities and available housing units. For 
instance, from 2000 to 2010, 39 out of 82 counties gained population and 13 of these 
gained by ten percent. Meanwhile, 41 counties experienced a population decline between 
2000 and 2012. Many of these counties are primarily located in the Mississippi Delta 
where the economic base has historically been heavily reliant on agriculture. Some of 
them experienced population loss percentages in the double digits. Population loss in 
rural areas can be attributed to a decrease in farming activities, high poverty, lack of job 
opportunities and other industries, difficult access to healthcare, education and retail 
services, low natural amenities and general remoteness (McGranahan and Beale 2002). 
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Population growth or decline can have significant influence over the availability of 
housing units and local economic activities. Decisions regarding mitigation planning, 
building codes, flood control, storm water control and protection of wetlands have to take 
change in population density into account.  
5.3.6.1 Population Stability: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 Population stability as an indicator is present in all the pre-Katrina and post-
Katrina County HMPs for Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson. Hurricane Katrina has 
significantly impacted the population growth trend in the Gulf Coast counties. As of 
2010, Harrison, Hancock, and Jackson rebounded to their pre-Katrina population levels. 
The 2001 Hancock County HMP mentions the percentage change in population but did 
not go into detail about the impact of such change. By contrast, the 2013 updated version 
discusses population change in terms of available housing and effects on economic 
growth. Planners also map and locate dense population centers to decentralize shelters.  
 The 2001 Harrison HMP also mentions population changes, especially post-
disaster, in terms of housing unit availability, but does not go into more detail. By 2013, 
planners incorporated population changes into decision making to address evacuation 
mapping, flood mapping, hazard awareness and sheltering. In Jackson County, a more 
detailed assessment about population change was found in the 2012 County HMP.  
Similar to Hancock and Harrison counties, the planners incorporate change in population 
density into risk and capability assessments along with calculating available housing 
units.  
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5.3.7 Indicators Absent from Hazard Mitigation Plans 
The indicators for crop insurance damage, nuclear accident planning and 
performance regimes are absent in all of the state and county HMPs. Although these 
HMPs contain information about crop damage, they have no mention of crop insurance. 
As for nuclear accident planning, it was identified as a non-prioritized hazard in the 2004 
State HMP, because as of present, Mississippi only has one nuclear power plant. The 
document did not include any reference regarding population residing nearby the nuclear 
plant.  Lastly, the methodological approach to calculate the metrics for the performance 
regimes is a straight-distance measurement between county seat to the nearest 
Metropolitan Statistical Area or the state capital. These metrics are not observed in any of 
HMPs in addition function as constant values in BRIC institutional resilience in 2000 and 
2010. As such, they were not included in the analysis.  
5.4 Summary 
The results of the content analysis in Chapter 4 illustrate that the BRIC 
institutional resilience sub-index contains many elements that can be found in state and 
local hazard mitigation (HMPs) plans. Six out of ten institutional resilience indicators are 
present throughout, however, the output metrics of these resilience indicators are not 
always found in HMPs. Mitigation spending, flood insurance coverage and disaster aid 
experience are found in the pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina state and local HMPs while 
jurisdictional coordination, local disaster training and population stability are found in 
some and not others. Content analysis of HMPs provides supplementary information for 
each of the institution resilience indicators, allowing for differentiation between a 
theoretical approach and institutional practices. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 This chapter contains four discussion topics. The first topic analyzes the utility of 
the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) institutional resilience sub-
index. The second topic discusses the changes to mitigation practices at the state and 
local scale in post-Hurricane Katrina period. The third topic suggests improvements for 
BRIC institutional resilience sub-index and for state and local hazard mitigation plans. 
Finally, the last topic covers the future outlooks on how to bridge the gap between 
institutional resilience indicators and institutional practices.  
6.1 Utility of the BRIC Institutional Resilience (IR) Sub-Index with regard to the 
State of Mississippi and Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties  
 
 The establishment of baselines and periodic examination of reliance markers 
relative to that baseline is an important consideration in the development of standards 
(McAllister 2013). Replication of the BRIC institutional resilience sub-index at the state 
scale (n=82) demonstrates that it is useful for establishing a resilience baseline as well as 
measuring how that baseline has shifted in Mississippi post-disaster. Indicators such as 
mitigation spending, flood insurance coverage, crop insurance coverage, jurisdictional 
coordination and population stability are more likely to change from pre- to post-Katrina 
within a ten-year interval. By contrast, nuclear plant accident planning, local disaster 
training, and the two performance regimes are less likely to change. Evaluation of the 
absolute and standardized values of the resilience metrics illustrate that there are some 
discrepancies in terms of institutional drivers of change in resilience at the state and local
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scale. At the state scale, the Wilcoxson Signed-Rank Test is useful for determining which 
indicators are statistically different from 2000 to 2010. By comparison, observations of 
changes in rank are more appropriate in determining the indicators that drive change in 
institutional resilience at the local tri-county scale. 
Mitigation spending, flood insurance coverage, disaster aid experience, 
jurisdictional coordination, and crop insurance coverage drive change in institutional 
resilience at the state scale while only the first three mentioned indicators along with 
population stability drive institutional resilience for Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson 
counties. The changes in indicators such as mitigation spending and flood insurance 
coverage can be directly linked to Hurricane Katrina while the rest have weaker linkage 
or no relationship with the disaster itself. Undoubtedly, the impacts of Hurricane Katrina 
have influenced the dramatic increase in mitigation spending and expansion of flood 
coverage, both at the state scale and the tri-coastal county scale.  
In the case of mitigation spending, the majority of the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP) grants received between 2001 and 2010 by the state of Mississippi, 
Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties were directly related to the Hurricane Katrina. 
As for flood insurance coverage, Hurricane Katrina produced a significant amount of 
surge and coastal flooding resulting in more than $2.6 billion in National Flood Insurance 
Program claims (FEMA 2015a). In the post-Katrina period, the state significantly 
increased the number of flood insurance policies in the post-Katrina period (FEMA 
2015a). In Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties, the number of national flood 
insurance policies has almost doubled or tripled from 2000 to 2010. The changes as 
assessed by the BRIC IR metrics in mitigation spending and flood insurance coverage are 
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consistent with the findings within the academic literature and by FEMA (Kunreuther 
2006; Rose 2007; Berke and Godschalk 2009; Nance 2009; Michel-Kerjan 2010; FEMA 
2015a).  
According to the BRIC IR sub-index, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties are 
the most resilient counties in Mississippi in 2010. This assessment is difficult to validate. 
Changes in institutional resilience for these three counties are mainly driven by the 
increase in mitigation spending and flood insurance coverage, which are directly linked 
to Katrina. However, spikes in mitigation spending and expansion of flood insurance 
policies are reactive policy decisions rather than proactive ones (Mitchell 2006a; Landry 
and Li 2011). As such, an additional temporal setting (e.g. BRIC IR 2015) is needed to 
examine how institutional indicators perform in periods without a major disaster or 
whether such institutional resilience decreases over time relative to other counties in the 
state.  
At the state scale, changes in crop insurance coverage, jurisdictional coordination, 
and disaster aid experience have weaker or no linkages to Hurricane Katrina. Although 
the change in the level of crop insurance from 2000 to 2010 is statistically relevant, this 
increase could be partially be linked to the crop damage by Hurricane Katrina, or the 
prevalence of pests and diseases, or some combination of factors (Glauber et al. 2002). 
Similarly, the decrease of the number of government and special districts in Mississippi 
counties could be linked to Hurricane Katrina. Consolidation of governmental agencies 
and districts could be a result of lessons learned post-disaster in order to improve 
response, communication, and coordination during times of crisis (Ansell et al. 2010). As 
observed in the BRIC IR sub-index, the linkage between the jurisdictional coordination 
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indicator and Hurricane Katrina is difficult to establish because decrease in political 
fragmentation can also be a function of governmental reform over time. Lastly, disaster 
aid experience has little to no association with Hurricane Katrina as measured by the 
numeric counts of loss events and the Presidential Disaster Declarations (PDDs). The 
numeric counts did not distinguish between the dollar amount of a high loss event and a 
low loss event. This lack of monetary distinction is also applied to PDD events. As such, 
Katrina would be counted the same way as less severe events.  
 At the tri-coastal county scale, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties rank 
significantly higher in 2010 than 2000 in terms of population stability. Between 1995 and 
2000, these three counties had modest to high population growth, but in the immediate 
aftermath of Katrina, the Mississippi Coast experienced substantial population loss due to 
evacuation or permanent relocation (Hori and Shafter 2010). As a result, between 2005 
and 2010, the indicator shows little to no population growth because these counties are 
still recovering to their pre-Katrina levels.  
 For future improvements, planners may want to incorporate state and county data 
and tailor the BRIC IR sub-index to represent local needs (Frazier 2013; Singh-Person et 
al. 2013). For instance, the local disaster training variable was intended to capture the 
degree of preparedness at the county level. Given that the value for this indicator was 
missing for many Mississippi counties, planners could utilize alternative proxies such as 
Fire Corps, Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police Program and other Citizen Corps 
programs to measure local disaster preparedness.  
The BRIC index as a whole provides a good basis for benchmarking resilience. 
However, it is important to understand the processes that are involved in the index 
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construction such as theoretical and practical justification, variable selection, data 
availability, weighting, scalability, transformation and standardization process (Cutter et 
al. 2008b; Fekete 2009; Tate 2012). Without a good grasp of these processes, it may be 
difficult to utilize the output metrics to responsibly allocate resources. 
6.2 Content Analysis of Hazard Mitigation Plans for the State of Mississippi and 
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties 
 
 Overall findings for the second research question indicate that there are 
substantial differences from the pre- to post-Katrina hazard mitigation plans at the state 
and local level. Between the first and the most updated hazard mitigation plans, the 
categories of hazard prioritization, vulnerability and capability assessment, scenario 
modeling, reporting of losses, jurisdictional coordination, and public outreach are 
generally improved. Many of these observed improvements, however, are the result of 
changed federal requirements in order to qualify for funding from the Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program along with other hazard related programs (Birkland and Waterland 2008; 
Berke et al. 2012). As such, the changes in pre- and post-Katrina mitigation practices can 
be attributed to federal top-down directives rather than local initiatives, even though state 
and local inputs and initiatives in mitigation planning are observed in several categories. 
6.2.1 Hazard Identification in State and Local Hazard Mitigation Planning 
 In the post-Katrina setting, state and local governments initiated hazard mitigation 
councils to improve coordination and communication between representatives from 
different government agencies, researchers, non-profits, planners, business communities, 
and public health facilities. At the state level, the Hazard Mitigation Council approved a 
new hazard ranking process. This Hazard Ranking Methodology, adopted in the 2013 
State HMP, evaluates each hazard based on risk and vulnerability characteristics such as 
 86 
area impacted, public health, property damage, environmental damage and economic 
disruption. These are used in conjunction with the usual method of estimating probability 
of future occurrence. As required by FEMA, this hazard ranking process also includes 
extensive assessment of local hazard mitigation plans to match up the hazards of concern 
to local communities (Berke et al. 2012). For example, the 2013 HMP established that if 
45 percent or fewer of the local plans identified the hazard, it was deemed to pose no 
significant threat to the state.  
Furthermore, the Hazard Ranking Methodology also influences how each hazard 
is profiled in terms of loss and scenario modeling, which consists of potential losses in 
lives and property, building exposure, debris generation, population displaced and 
emergency shelters needed. As a result, mitigation actions are prioritized based on the 
hazard ranking and assessment. The majority of mitigation strategies focus on tornado, 
dam and levee failure, tropical cyclone, flood, and wildfire because these hazards possess 
a high risk level. The Council excluded technological and manmade hazards because they 
pose less of a threat to the state than natural ones. These hazards are also not a federal 
requirement for an HMP. Similarly, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties excluded 
assessment of these hazards in their most recent HMPs as well.  
Although elected local mitigation councils for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson 
counties consulted on the hazard ranking process, only Harrison County’s most updated 
HMP incorporated the state-wide hazard ranking approach. The hazard identification and 
prioritization process as applied in the 2013 State HMP is not seen in the local HMPs for 
Hancock and Jackson Counties. These two counties rely on public surveys and 
probability of occurrence to prioritize and profile local hazards. The local HMPs from 
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Hancock and Jackson counties identify hazards based on historical records and past 
damages, which include casualties and property and economic damage. By contrast, 
Harrison County HMP incorporates findings from public surveys along with its Hazard 
Ranking Index, similar to that of the state, to determine how to it will address each 
hazard. One of the reasons Hancock and Jackson Counties have not adopted the state’s 
Hazard Ranking Methodology is because it is too new. The state unveiled the 
methodology in 2013, which means that the 2013 Hancock County HMP and 2012 
Jackson County HMP did not have enough time to integrate it into their local plans. It is 
likely that the Hazard Ranking Methodology will be incorporated in the next version of 
the local HMPs.   
The hazard prioritization process is driven by different interests within the 
councils, and this affects the types of mitigation funding the state or local government 
may be able to acquire. There are two areas of concern in the process: (1) climate change 
and its related hazards (e.g. drought, sea-level-rise) and (2) public participation. The 2013 
State HMP has one mentioning of climate change, with limited details, even though a 
discussion of climate change and its effects on local extreme weather is now federally 
required (Babcock 2013). By comparison, local HMPs for Hancock, Harrison and 
Jackson counties elaborate on climate change and related hazards such sea-level-rise, 
droughts, and frequent flooding. This pattern is reflective of current literature that climate 
change adaptation predominately planning occurs at the local and municipal level and not 
as a top-down directive (Measham et al. 2011).  
Although the state and local hazard mitigation councils represent collaborative 
partnerships between government, non-profits, and business sectors, the more vulnerable 
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citizens are often excluded from the decision making process. FEMA requires that the 
planning process include public participation, which is usually observed in terms of 
posting a draft copy to a website, forums, workshops and surveys. These techniques are 
not as proactive in reaching out to disadvantaged groups such as low-income and 
minority racial and ethnic groups, who are often underrepresented in the decision-making 
process (Berke et al. 2012). State and local governments should consider using different 
types of participatory methods to mobilize and involve communities in the planning 
process employing consensus-based approaches and community outreach strategies 
(Pearce 2003).  
These observations as such relate closest to two institutional resilience indicators, 
mitigation spending and statewide coordination. Mitigation spending targets highly 
ranked hazards while statewide coordination points to increased coordination between 
state and local governments. One aspect to note about the relationship between the state 
and tri-county study area is that emergency management representatives from Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson work directly within the state’s Hazard Mitigation Council to 
update the State HMP. This is not the case for other counties in Mississippi, with the 
exception of DeSoto County. It bears repeating that the Mississippi Gulf Coast has 
enormous economic and political importance to the state. The involvement of their local 
representatives in the state mitigation planning process could indicate these coastal 
counties rank higher than others in terms of state prioritization and allocation of resources 
(Blaikie et al. 2004).  
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6.2.2 Jurisdictional Coordination at the Local Level 
 In the case of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties, one of the most 
significant changes from the pre- to post-Katrina period is the transition from county 
hazard mitigation plans to multijurisdictional mitigation plans. All of the current county 
HMPs for the study area cover multiple jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions within a county 
chose to opt out of the county’s multijurisdictional plan in order to create their own 
HMPs due to differences in priorities. Multijurisdictional mitigation planning can be a 
strong indication that there are increased coordination activities between the county and 
its local districts (Carr 2007). This means that overlapping mitigation actions and 
activities can be reduced based on jointly created plans.  
6.2.3 Reporting of Loss Data and Hazard Modeling 
 In order to meet federal guidelines, the post-Katrina state and county HMPs made 
substantial improvements in the reporting of losses section. The hazard modeling portion 
of the state and county HMPs is also substantially improved in the post-Katrina period. In 
the case of the state of Mississippi HMP, loss data on property damage and crop losses 
originated from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) were incorporated into the 
plan’s risk assessment of different hazards for each MEMA region. Similarly, Hancock, 
Harrison and Jackson counties incorporated loss records obtained from NCDC for each 
hazard in their probabilistic assessment of future occurrence. NCDC records are not as 
spatially accurate as loss data from the SHELDUS which provides place-specific history 
of losses (Gall et al. 2009).   
 The current state plan utilizes software like Digital Elevation Model, RiskMap 
and Storm Surge Modeling to simulate storm surges and flooding, which were not present 
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in the 2004 State HMP, to complement HAZUS-MH modeling. Moreover, the current 
state version includes worst-case-scenario assessments regarding exposure of population, 
infrastructure and critical facilities. The worst-case-scenario for hurricanes utilizes 
inundation levels and losses from Hurricane Katrina (500-Year-Event) to anticipate 
shelter requirements, infrastructural exposure and damages and debris generation. As 
well, at the county level, Hurricane Katrina exposed the vulnerability of both the social 
system and the physical system. In the case of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties, 
impacts from Hurricane Katrina on critical infrastructure, buildings and vulnerable 
population were considered in hurricane, storm surge, and flooding HAZUS-MH 
scenarios. 
6.2.4 Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program  
 In the post-Katrina period, there has been an increase in statewide participation in 
the NFIP program. Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties extended NFIP coverage to 
local jurisdictions and communities (Michel-Kerjan 2010). It is evident by the number of 
projects covered by the NFIP. This increase in NFIP participation is also captured by the 
flood insurance coverage metric. Furthermore, while there is some increase in the number 
of Community Rating System (CRS) communities, it has not risen dramatically. Only ten 
counties joined the CRS program in the post-Katrina period. Harrison and Jackson 
counties along with some of their local jurisdictions have joined CRS in 2003 and 2011 
respectively while Hancock County has not, although this is part of its future action 
goals. This finding is consistent with current literature relating to low participation in the 
CRS program, in part due to the voluntary nature of the program and land-use 
development conflicts (Burby 2001; Landry and Li 2011)  
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6.2.5 Social Vulnerability Assessment 
 The pre-Katrina State and County HMP only contained brief mentions of 
vulnerable populations. Assessment of social vulnerability in the post-Katrina period has 
seen some improvements, particularly at the state level. The 2013 State HMP derives 
socio-demographic variables from the Social Vulnerability Index, or SoVI, to identify 
vulnerable populations and communities (Cutter et al. 2003). The results from social 
vulnerability assessment are incorporated into mitigation actions. As part of their 
mitigation goal, the state of Mississippi and Jackson County determined to conduct 
public outreach to vulnerable populations such as the elderly, low-income and non-native 
speakers. In contrast, instead of targeting certain population demographics, Hancock 
County and Harrison counties have some mitigation actions related to reducing risk in 
socially vulnerable communities. Systematic social vulnerability assessment should be 
carried out in tandem with community outreach and educational programs (Pearce 2003; 
Berke and Campanella 2008).  
6.3 Suggested Improvements for BRIC Institutional Resilience Sub-Index and 
Hazard Mitigation Planning 
  
It is difficult to obtain evidence to validate BRIC, because it is a generalization of 
certain aspect of on the ground reality. The quantitative evaluation of the BRIC IR sub-
index combined with qualitative analysis of hazard mitigation practices shed light on the 
complexity of disaster resilience. The analysis of state and local HMPs provided 
supplementary information and contextualization to the resilience metrics and indicators 
regarding changes in institutional resilience pre- and post-Katrina. 
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6.3.1 Compatibility between BRIC’s Institutional Resilience Indicators and Hazard 
Mitigation Practices 
 
Six out of the ten institutional resilience indicators utilized in BRIC are found in 
hazard mitigation plans. There are certain degrees of compatibility and incompatibility 
between the resilience indicators and their respective presence in hazard mitigation plans. 
For example, increase in mitigation spending contributes to higher overall IR scores for 
the majority of Mississippi counties. Increased investment in mitigation activities can 
also be seen in the substantial improvements in the pre- and post-Katrina plans. As well, 
the expansion of flood insurance coverage results in an increase in the IR scores and the 
post-Katrina HMPs. In the case of disaster aid experience, information regarding 
presidential disaster declarations and loss-causing events were found in the HMPs, 
although the ratio does not apply. In addition, the ratio does not differentiate the 
difference in dollar amount between each loss event. In the future, the disaster aid 
experience indicator should take in consideration the loss amounts. Another example of 
compatibility can be found in local disaster training; however, the mentioning of CERT is 
only present in some pre-and post-Katrina HMPs.    
 By comparison, jurisdictional coordination is measured by a ratio of the number 
of governments and special districts per 10,000 people. This ratio is not present in the 
mitigation plans, but the characteristics of jurisdictional coordination, as suggested by the 
extant academic literature, can be found in terms of multi-jurisdictional mitigation 
planning. An alternative metric that can perhaps capture jurisdictional coordination is a 
binary variable recording presence or absence of multi-jurisdictional plan. Moreover, one 
could also count the number of jurisdictions covered by a multiple-jurisdictional plan. 
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The more jurisdictions there are participating in a jointly created plan, the more 
coordination between a county and its local districts.  
Furthermore, in the case of the study area, the population stability indicator did 
not capture the immediate population loss during Hurricane Katrina because it measures 
the population change every five years. Since the first two years post-disaster is an 
important period for displaced communities to return and rebuild, this indicator fails to 
capture the significance of post-disaster population displacement. This observation, 
however, does not negate that the need for calculating population stability. Within the 
scope of this research, this BRIC IR indicator has limited utility. In order to improve 
measurement of population stability, especially for heavy impacted areas in the post-
Katrina context, instead of measuring population change by a five-year increment, it 
could be measured every one to two years. Population stability can be calculated by using 
Special Population Estimates for Impacted Counties in the Gulf Coast area or the 2005 
American Community Survey Special Product for the Gulf Coast Area (Frey and Singer 
2006). 
 Finally, the performance regime indicators, based on their theoretical orientation 
are not applicable to the qualitative analysis. None of the HMPs mention the benefits of 
having its county seat near a metropolitan statistical area or close proximity to the capital. 
This does not mean that these indicators are useless. An alternative way to measure the 
advantage of being close to the capital is looking into State HMP to see which county 
representatives were consulted during the planning process (Blaikie et al. 2004). For 
example, the indicator of the first performance regime (e.g. proximity of county seat to 
capital) for Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties indicate that these counties are 
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located relatively far from the capital. However, an in-depth assessment of the State HMP 
shows that the emergency representatives from only four counties were present during the 
planning process. These counties include Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, and DeSoto. As 
such, long distance between the county seat and the capital does not mean that there is 
less communication between county and state representatives.  
6.3.2 Suggested Improvements in Hazard Mitigation Plans  
In the case of State and Local HMPs, there are some areas that could be 
improved. First, the 2013 State of Mississippi HMP uses SHELDUS data for its inflation 
adjustment property only for tornadoes. As for the rest of the hazards, the loss-causing 
event data comes from NCDC, which is not adjusted for inflation. In the case of the tri-
county study area, none of the HMPs use inflation-adjusted data. As such, using the best 
available and most accurate data are important to enhancing institutional resilience. 
Losses that occurred ten to twenty years earlier are different in terms of monetary 
amounts to losses experienced in the present or recent past. In the future, the state and 
counties should use inflation adjusted loss data (Gall et al. 2009).  
Systematic and standardized social vulnerability assessment was included in the 
2013 State HMP, but this has not trickled down to the counties. This form of assessment 
should parallel physical assessments to reduce not only losses in property but also in 
lives. Socially vulnerable populations, who are not only at-risk in terms of exposure but 
also response and recovery, should be considered in mitigation actions (Pearce 2003). 
Lastly, although the HMPs take population stability into consideration, they do not 
incorporate potential population surges or losses into worst-case-scenario planning. An 
unexpected surge in population can overwhelm the ability of institutions to manage crises 
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(Sherrieb et al. 2010). Dramatic population loss can affect tax bases and upkeep of 
critical facilities. These should be factored into state and county probabilistic scenarios. 
6.3.3 Suggested Institutional Indicators Outside of the BRIC Institutional Resilience 
Sub-Index 
 
The analysis of state and local hazard mitigation plans yield useful insights 
regarding additional indicators for the BRIC institutional resilience sub-index. 
Institutional resilience can be measured by conducting a longitudinal assessment on the 
reduction of repetitive loss properties. They are defined as any property for which four or 
more flood insurance claims of more than $1,000 have been paid within any rolling ten-
year-period since Jan 1, 1978 (FEMA 2011). State and local governments track and 
FEMA track repetitive loss properties. Data for this indicator can be requested from 
FEMA’s BureauNet (FEMA 2011).  
Another potential measurement of institutional resilience is the number of 
approved Emergency Action Plans at the county level. Emergency Action Plans are 
designed to minimize or mitigate the impacts of potential dam or levee failures. They are 
also applicable in the case of nuclear power plants, coal mining, oil production plants, 
refineries (Binder 2002). Within the context of BRIC index, the number of EAPs should 
be examined for dams and levees, which are vulnerable to excessive flooding, 
earthquakes, and other hazards. Similar to the nuclear accident planning, this indicator, 
which assesses the number of EAPs per county, should incorporate nearby population 
centers into consideration (Walh 1997). Data can be acquired via the state Department of 
Environmental Quality or other departments that are in charge of regulating dam safety.  
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6.4  Institutional Resilience: For Whom? To What? 
 As presented in the literature review section, the definition of resilience is 
contested among scholars from various disciplines. In addition, there is no agreed upon 
definition for institutional resilience. Some perceive institutional resilience as an over-
arching force and a causal agent that influences multiple facets of resilience (i.e. social, 
economic, infrastructural, and ecological) while others frame it as a component of a 
resilient system, paralleling economic, social, infrastructural, community capital, and 
ecological resilience (Adger 2000; Cutter et al. 2008b). In this study, institutional 
resilience is associated with the latter framing. Here I propose to define it based on the 
observations that were made in the research and analysis process. Institutional resilience 
can be defined as the ability of governance organizations, which are made up of 
government agencies, community groups, non-profits, private sector and other actors 
involved in the emergency management process, to minimize disruptions, respond, and 
recover from disaster through effective and proactive coordination, communication, and 
planning. Similar to other aspects of system resilience, it also means the ability to 
incorporate continuous learning from past disasters and recovery challenges such that 
organizations and institutions can adapt and be more prepared for future shocks and 
disruptions. Moreover, institutional resilience goes beyond sustaining physical structures 
but also involving vulnerable and at-risk populations in the planning process through 
outreach and educational programs. 
6.5 Theoretical Contribution: Operationalizing the DROP Model  
 The Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) Model in Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
schematic representation of disaster resilience. The BRIC indicators are selected and 
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designed to measure inherent resilience, which are characteristics of the system that 
function well during non-crisis periods (Cutter et al. 2003; Cutter et al. 2014b). In 
examining the effect of Hurricane Katrina on the institutional resilience on the state of 
Mississippi and its coastal areas, it is evident that some indicators of institutional 
resilience sub-indexes could be classified to measure adaptive resilience. Mitigation 
spending and flood insurance coverage have increased significantly in the post-disaster 
period. The state also significantly expanded its flood insurance participation. These 
findings were found in the institutional resilience metrics and the state and local hazard 
mitigation plans.  
Comparison of the pre- and post-Katrina HMPs indicate that there are 
characteristics of social learning in terms of social vulnerability assessment, hazard 
modeling, hazard classification and ranking, participation in the NFIP program, and 
multi-level jurisdictional coordination. Social learning “occurs when beneficial 
impromptu actions are formalized into institutional policy for handling future events” 
(Cutter et al. 2003, 603). Lessons learned from Katrina were incorporated in the updated 
version of both state and local HMPs to improve preparedness activities and policy 
decisions regarding land-use planning, building codes, zoning and structural buyouts.  
These post-disaster lessons are fed back into the next phase mitigation planning, and as 
such social learning from the previous disaster experience strengthen the inherent 
resilience characteristics, from which a community can become more resilient as it 
prepares for future disruptive events.   
Identification of adaptive resilience indicators can help inform the disaster 
policymaking process. As observed in the BRIC IR sub-index and HMPs, indicators such 
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as mitigation spending and flood insurance coverage are part of actionable policy 
decisions. These indicators are the drivers of institutional resilience in the context of 
Mississippi. More future work is needed to identify adaptive resilience indicators in other 
sub-indices such as social, economic, infrastructural, community capital, and ecological 
factors.  
6.6 Future Research 
Due to the difficulty in acquiring HMPs at different temporal settings, other types 
of plans such as pre-disaster, recovery, comprehensive and emergency plans were not 
considered in this research. Frazier et al. (2013) find elements of institutional resilience 
present in post-disaster redevelopment plans and comprehensive plans for Sarasota 
County. Moreover, the authors also observe elements of social, economic, infrastructural 
and community capital in these planning documents as well. This suggests that hazard 
mitigation plans and other planning documents are useful in terms of evaluating different 
aspects of resilience related to policy decision-making (Berke and Campanella 2008).  
This study focuses on institutional resilience in the context of pre- and post-
Hurricane Katrina. Six of the indicators of the institutional sub-index were found in local 
and state hazard mitigation plans. It would be useful to conduct a similar study centered 
on a different type of disaster such as tornadoes, earthquakes, or droughts in other states 
in the U.S. Alternatively, the BRIC index could be applied in the context of Hurricane 
Katrina but using other sub-indices such as social, economic, infrastructural, community 
capital, and environmental at the national and state scale. In addition, Hurricane Katrina 
is shown to be influential in driving change in institutional resilience. It would also be 
valuable to examine how institutional and other types of resilience indicators (i.e. social, 
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economic, infrastructural, community capital, and environmental) perform during periods 
without a major disaster. Examination of the indicators and metrics in these sub-indices 
and how they change over time can contribute to a holistic understanding of disaster 
resilience. 
Moreover, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties are economically and 
politically important to the state. Representatives from the targeted coastal counties 
directly participate in the hazard mitigation planning and decision-making process, as 
compared to other counties in Mississippi. It would be useful to examine the HMPs from 
the less economically developed and least populous counties and determine how they 
coordinate with the state with regard to mitigation planning and how their institutional 
resilience scores have changed before and after a disastrous event.   
6.7 Conclusion 
This study confirms that the BRIC institutional resilience sub-index is useful in 
terms of evaluating the overall resilience of a community as well as to longitudinally 
compare resilience before and after a disaster. Given that the overall BRIC score for each 
county is a composite, Hurricane Katrina is an influential factor in driving the change in 
both institutional resilience and overall system resilience. Application of the BRIC 
institutional resilience sub-index reveals the effects of scaling and standardization and 
how these processes can obscure significant contextual details. Replication of the sub-
index demonstrates that scaling and contextualization matter in terms of explaining the 
utility of the resilience metrics and indicators. Scaling at the national level will yield 
different BRIC scores along with different metrics for each indicator. In addition, it is 
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important to evaluate both the absolute and standardized data to holistically interpret the 
BRIC results.  
Evaluation of the state and local HMPs adds another level of contextualization to 
explain the BRIC IR indicators as well provide useful insights into the disaster 
governance structure of the state of Mississippi. At both state and local level, the hazard 
mitigation plans are designed to meet the minimum federal requirements. Improvements 
in mitigation practice from pre- and to post-Katrina period are a function increased 
federal standards over time, even though there are various aspects initiated by the state 
and local counties. Best planning practice means that planners and representatives going 
beyond that what is required by the federal governments. Examples of these include the 
participation of socially vulnerable groups in the decision-making process, incorporation 
of inflation-adjusted loss data, addressing the issue of land-use in hazardous areas, and 
integrating climate change adaptation into planning practices.  
Mitigation has tremendous value to society in terms of safety, equity and 
sustainability. Proactive mitigation planning helps create safer communities, reduce loss 
of life and property damage, and allows individuals to minimize post-disaster disruptions 
and recover more quickly (Godschalk 2003; Yoon et al. 2015). Resilience is a concept 
and a practice that will become increasingly relevant in the future. Recently, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development launched a National Disaster Resilience 
Competition to help affected communities recover from disasters and prepare to mitigate 
risk. Personnel from federal agencies are partnering with universities, local governments, 
and non-profit institutions, notably the Rockefeller Foundation, to design mitigation 
strategies for different eligible communities. By using qualitative analysis to complement 
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quantitative findings as well as focusing on one specific aspect of resilience, the 
methodological approach of this study can be reproduced for studying and improving 
other facets of resilience indicators and metrics. This mixed-method approach seeks to 
answer the research questions while concurrently working to bridge the conceptual 
understanding between hazard research and practice. 
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APPENDIX A: BRIC INSITITUTIONAL RESILIENCE SCORES FOR 
EIGHTY-TWO COUNTIES IN MISSISSIPPI  
 This appendix features the composite BRIC institutional resilience (IR) scores of 
eighty-two counties in Mississippi, aggregated at the state scale, for 2000 and 2010. Each 
county is ranked based on its IR score, which ranges from 0 to 10, with each unit 
increased indicating more resilience. Table A.1 and A.2 contain detailed breakdown of 
the standardized values of the IR indicators, which range from 0 to 1, with each unit 
increased indicating more resilience.  
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Table A.1: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for eighty-two counties in 
Mississippi in 2000, aggregated at state scale (n=82) 
 
Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2000 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
43 Adams 3.26 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.40 0.00 0.62 0.33 0.94 0.00 0.04 
67 Alcorn 2.72 0.03 0.01 0.80 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.88 0.00 0.16 
39 Amite 3.33 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.22 0.00 0.61 0.71 0.95 0.00 0.01 
53 Attala 3.09 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.23 0.00 0.74 0.50 0.89 0.00 0.03 
78 Benton 2.47 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.81 0.99 0.00 0.12 
62 Bolivar 2.84 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.21 0.88 0.00 0.65 
69 Calhoun 2.66 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.43 0.28 1.00 0.00 0.32 
58 Carroll 2.97 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.32 0.00 0.67 0.34 0.83 0.00 0.15 
77 Chickasaw 2.49 0.00 0.01 0.63 0.11 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.92 0.00 0.25 
73 Choctaw 2.60 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.42 0.00 0.60 0.14 0.81 0.00 0.01 
3 Claiborne 4.53 0.00 0.07 0.84 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.05 
61 Clarke 2.88 0.00 0.08 0.67 0.32 0.00 0.63 0.26 0.92 0.00 0.01 
56 Clay 3.05 0.01 0.09 0.85 0.37 0.00 0.42 0.17 0.97 0.00 0.17 
32 Coahoma 3.42 0.01 0.06 0.50 0.38 0.00 0.37 0.56 0.91 0.00 0.62 
13 Copiah 3.85 0.00 0.02 0.79 0.21 0.00 0.89 1.00 0.93 0.00 0.02 
30 Covington 3.54 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.54 0.00 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.03 
70 DeSoto 2.65 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.35 0.00 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
26 Forrest 3.61 0.00 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.63 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 
21 Franklin 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.93 0.00 0.70 0.51 0.94 0.00 0.01 
42 George 3.28 0.00 0.06 0.89 0.22 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.68 0.00 0.04 
49 Greene 3.19 0.00 0.05 0.82 0.48 0.00 0.43 0.80 0.59 0.00 0.01 
7 Grenada 4.23 1.00 0.13 0.89 0.35 0.00 0.52 0.25 0.90 0.00 0.18 
8 Hancock 3.96 0.01 1.00 0.76 0.38 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 
4 Harrison 4.47 0.54 0.57 0.97 0.25 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 
6 Hinds 4.41 0.01 0.24 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.00 0.05 
44 Holmes 3.26 0.00 0.04 0.62 0.13 0.00 0.77 0.56 0.96 0.00 0.18 
14 Humphreys 3.84 0.24 0.24 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.73 0.41 0.93 0.00 0.58 
1
1
5
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Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2000 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
18 Issaquena 3.72 0.00 0.79 0.50 0.48 0.00 0.73 0.29 0.49 0.00 0.44 
80 Itawamba 2.45 0.05 0.01 0.78 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.37 0.80 0.00 0.11 
10 Jackson 3.88 0.02 0.53 0.96 0.27 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.86 0.00 0.01 
38 Jasper 3.34 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.38 0.00 0.78 0.59 0.85 0.00 0.00 
34 Jefferson 3.39 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.53 0.00 0.73 0.51 0.80 0.03 0.05 
23 
Jefferson 
Davis 
3.65 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.53 0.00 0.79 0.68 0.94 0.00 0.01 
35 Jones 3.38 0.00 0.06 0.89 0.14 0.00 0.68 0.66 0.93 0.00 0.01 
51 Kemper 3.15 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.46 0.00 0.59 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 
68 Lafayette 2.67 0.00 0.01 0.88 0.18 0.00 0.30 0.65 0.60 0.00 0.06 
54 Lamar 3.08 0.02 0.04 0.85 0.16 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.41 0.00 0.01 
55 Lauderdale 3.06 0.00 0.08 0.97 0.09 0.00 0.63 0.29 1.00 0.00 0.00 
20 Lawrence 3.70 0.00 0.04 0.77 0.55 0.00 0.79 0.66 0.87 0.00 0.02 
31 Leake 3.50 0.07 0.02 0.84 0.30 0.00 0.82 0.63 0.80 0.00 0.01 
72 Lee 2.63 0.01 0.05 0.88 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.82 0.00 0.27 
1 Leflore 4.66 0.73 0.47 0.77 0.19 0.00 0.62 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.68 
24 Lincoln 3.64 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.36 0.00 0.79 0.75 0.85 0.00 0.00 
33 Lowndes 3.41 0.07 0.28 0.90 0.28 0.00 0.40 0.35 0.99 0.00 0.14 
11 Madison 3.86 0.05 0.10 0.93 0.26 0.00 0.94 1.00 0.51 0.00 0.06 
17 Marion 3.72 0.00 0.15 0.88 0.34 0.00 0.67 0.68 1.00 0.00 0.01 
40 Marshall 3.30 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.42 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.10 
66 Monroe 2.78 0.00 0.06 0.84 0.19 0.00 0.34 0.14 0.95 0.00 0.26 
60 Montgomery 2.90 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.21 0.96 0.00 0.17 
64 Neshoba 2.81 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.03 0.00 0.71 0.34 0.79 0.00 0.00 
63 Newton 2.81 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.15 0.00 0.74 0.37 0.89 0.00 0.00 
46 Noxubee 3.22 0.00 0.02 0.70 0.42 0.00 0.51 0.48 0.98 0.00 0.11 
74 Oktibbeha 2.57 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.15 0.00 0.49 0.16 0.80 0.00 0.03 
57 Panola 3.00 0.00 0.03 0.63 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.73 0.77 0.00 0.41 
47 Pearl River 3.21 0.07 0.14 0.91 0.30 0.00 0.51 0.72 0.56 0.00 0.01 
28 Perry 3.56 0.00 0.09 0.59 0.53 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 
1
1
6
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Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2000 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid 
Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
37 Pike 3.37 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.27 0.00 0.64 0.69 0.94 0.00 0.01 
71 Pontotoc 2.64 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.35 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.68 0.00 0.16 
76 Prentiss 2.51 0.00 0.01 0.76 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.81 0.00 0.22 
5 Quitman 4.44 0.65 0.12 0.06 0.68 0.00 0.36 0.62 0.95 0.00 1.00 
27 Rankin 3.58 0.00 0.12 0.92 0.10 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.02 
36 Scott 3.37 0.00 0.01 0.83 0.24 0.00 0.85 0.63 0.78 0.00 0.02 
65 Sharkey 2.79 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.76 0.36 0.84 0.00 0.54 
9 Simpson 3.90 0.01 0.04 0.87 0.29 0.00 0.91 1.00 0.77 0.00 0.01 
22 Smith 3.69 0.00 0.01 0.70 0.57 0.00 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.00 0.00 
50 Stone 3.15 0.00 0.02 0.78 0.26 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 
45 Sunflower 3.25 0.09 0.06 0.67 0.16 0.00 0.63 0.15 0.74 0.00 0.75 
41 Tallahatchie 3.28 0.00 0.07 0.38 0.26 0.00 0.45 0.46 0.97 0.00 0.68 
12 Tate 3.85 0.00 0.01 0.76 1.00 0.00 0.23 1.00 0.62 0.00 0.23 
75 Tippah 2.52 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.66 0.93 0.00 0.09 
79 Tishomingo 2.46 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.85 0.00 0.07 
25 Tunica 3.63 0.00 0.09 0.51 0.63 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.76 0.00 0.43 
81 Union 2.43 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.62 0.65 0.00 0.18 
29 Walthall 3.56 0.00 0.07 0.89 0.47 0.00 0.64 0.55 0.92 0.00 0.03 
15 Warren 3.82 0.06 0.09 0.90 0.08 0.00 0.86 0.67 0.97 0.00 0.19 
2 Washington 4.61 0.67 0.45 0.85 0.37 0.00 0.59 0.29 0.83 0.00 0.55 
52 Wayne 3.12 0.00 0.03 0.85 0.38 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.78 0.00 0.01 
59 Webster 2.96 0.00 0.01 0.63 0.58 0.00 0.52 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 
16 Wilkinson 3.74 0.00 0.07 0.69 0.93 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.80 0.00 0.03 
48 Winston 3.20 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.57 0.00 0.62 0.18 0.97 0.00 0.03 
82 Yalobusha 2.25 0.00 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.80 0.00 0.11 
19 Yazoo 3.71 0.00 0.19 0.72 0.29 0.00 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.00 0.30 
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Table A.2: Breakdowns of BRIC institutional resilience scores and metrics (standardized values) for eighty-two counties in 
Mississippi in 2010, aggregated at state scale (n=82) 
 
Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2010 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
42 Adams 3.17 0.14 0.01 0.93 0.10 0.00 0.62 0.33 0.98 0.00 0.06 
77 Alcorn 2.43 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.81 0.00 0.11 
8 Amite 4.03 0.01 0.00 0.89 0.88 0.00 0.61 0.71 0.92 0.00 0.01 
37 Attala 3.25 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.18 0.00 0.74 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.02 
80 Benton 2.35 0.01 0.00 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.81 0.58 0.00 0.14 
76 Bolivar 2.52 0.02 0.09 0.45 0.08 0.00 0.52 0.21 0.56 0.00 0.59 
67 Calhoun 2.65 0.00 0.02 0.54 0.23 0.00 0.43 0.28 0.92 0.00 0.24 
53 Carroll 2.95 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.09 0.00 0.67 0.34 0.93 0.00 0.13 
71 Chickasaw 2.57 0.01 0.00 0.79 0.25 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.65 0.00 0.29 
81 Choctaw 2.31 0.02 0.00 0.71 0.23 0.00 0.60 0.14 0.59 0.00 0.02 
10 Claiborne 3.94 0.02 0.03 0.89 0.22 0.00 0.80 0.57 0.38 1.00 0.02 
69 Clarke 2.64 0.01 0.04 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.63 0.26 0.80 0.00 0.00 
54 Clay 2.94 0.01 0.06 0.92 0.36 0.00 0.42 0.17 0.90 0.00 0.10 
49 Coahoma 3.06 0.02 0.03 0.59 0.14 0.00 0.37 0.56 0.63 0.00 0.72 
7 Copiah 4.05 0.15 0.01 0.87 0.14 0.00 0.89 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 
35 Covington 3.31 0.02 0.02 0.89 0.07 0.00 0.76 0.66 0.87 0.00 0.02 
20 DeSoto 3.75 0.08 0.03 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 
19 Forrest 3.76 0.04 0.07 0.95 0.07 0.00 0.63 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 
43 Franklin 3.16 0.02 0.00 0.75 0.31 0.00 0.70 0.51 0.87 0.00 0.01 
4 George 4.37 0.18 0.04 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.77 0.00 0.05 
29 Greene 3.41 0.02 0.04 0.90 0.56 0.00 0.43 0.80 0.65 0.00 0.01 
59 Grenada 2.82 0.01 0.06 0.90 0.08 0.00 0.52 0.25 0.84 0.00 0.14 
1 Hancock 5.30 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.37 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 
3 Harrison 4.38 0.35 0.54 0.99 0.33 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
6 Hinds 4.13 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.00 0.03 
41 Holmes 3.19 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.24 0.00 0.77 0.56 0.66 0.00 0.19 
28 Humphreys 3.43 0.01 0.11 0.54 0.29 0.00 0.73 0.41 0.59 0.00 0.75 
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Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2010 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
75 Issaquena 2.53 0.00 0.44 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.73 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.41 
63 Itawamba 2.75 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.06 
2 Jackson 4.55 0.32 0.70 0.98 0.41 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.90 0.00 0.01 
47 Jasper 3.08 0.00 0.01 0.84 0.09 0.00 0.78 0.59 0.77 0.00 0.00 
68 Jefferson 2.65 0.02 0.00 0.79 0.19 0.00 0.73 0.51 0.31 0.03 0.05 
36 
Jefferson 
Davis 
3.30 0.02 0.00 0.77 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.68 0.81 0.00 0.02 
34 Jones 3.33 0.06 0.03 0.93 0.05 0.00 0.68 0.66 0.91 0.00 0.01 
51 Kemper 3.01 0.01 0.00 0.81 0.21 0.00 0.59 0.46 0.92 0.00 0.00 
72 Lafayette 2.55 0.02 0.02 0.93 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.65 0.40 0.00 0.05 
61 Lamar 2.80 0.09 0.03 0.95 0.07 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 
55 Lauderdale 2.93 0.07 0.04 0.99 0.06 0.00 0.63 0.29 0.85 0.00 0.00 
5 Lawrence 4.16 0.02 0.02 0.85 0.17 0.79 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.00 0.02 
31 Leake 3.37 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.21 0.00 0.82 0.63 0.77 0.00 0.00 
62 Lee 2.78 0.01 0.04 0.93 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.80 0.00 0.35 
14 Leflore 3.89 0.01 0.15 0.80 0.03 0.86 0.62 0.21 0.57 0.00 0.63 
22 Lincoln 3.67 0.12 0.01 0.94 0.16 0.00 0.79 0.75 0.89 0.00 0.01 
48 Lowndes 3.07 0.01 0.11 0.93 0.14 0.00 0.40 0.35 0.99 0.00 0.14 
23 Madison 3.64 0.02 0.06 0.97 0.07 0.00 0.94 1.00 0.51 0.00 0.07 
39 Marion 3.23 0.01 0.07 0.95 0.12 0.00 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.00 0.01 
45 Marshall 3.11 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.09 0.00 0.15 1.00 0.84 0.00 0.09 
57 Monroe 2.88 0.02 0.04 0.91 0.24 0.00 0.34 0.14 0.93 0.00 0.27 
78 Montgomery 2.41 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.03 0.00 0.62 0.21 0.71 0.00 0.13 
40 Neshoba 3.20 0.02 0.01 0.97 0.18 0.00 0.71 0.34 0.97 0.00 0.00 
56 Newton 2.90 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.06 0.00 0.74 0.37 0.89 0.00 0.00 
52 Noxubee 2.99 0.02 0.01 0.83 0.20 0.00 0.51 0.48 0.80 0.00 0.15 
79 Oktibbeha 2.39 0.03 0.04 0.94 0.28 0.00 0.49 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.03 
33 Panola 3.35 0.01 0.02 0.76 0.12 0.03 0.34 0.73 0.94 0.00 0.39 
25 Pearl River 3.56 0.22 0.10 0.96 0.27 0.00 0.51 0.72 0.77 0.00 0.01 
18 Perry 3.77 0.01 0.05 0.77 0.41 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 
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Rank County 
IR 
Score 
2010 
Mitigation 
Spending 
Flood 
Insurance 
Coverage 
Jurisdiction 
Coord 
Disaster 
Aid Exp 
Disaster 
Training 
Near 
State 
Capital 
Near 
MSA 
Population 
Stability 
Nuclear 
Planning 
Crop 
Insurance 
Coverage 
24 Pike 3.62 0.11 0.01 0.90 0.36 0.00 0.64 0.69 0.91 0.00 0.01 
65 Pontotoc 2.72 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.77 0.00 0.21 
64 Prentiss 2.74 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.96 0.00 0.18 
32 Quitman 3.36 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.43 0.00 0.36 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
15 Rankin 3.88 0.05 0.07 0.96 0.05 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.00 0.04 
26 Scott 3.53 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.17 0.00 0.85 0.63 0.94 0.00 0.03 
82 Sharkey 2.26 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.76 0.36 0.33 0.00 0.52 
13 Simpson 3.92 0.01 0.02 0.91 0.11 0.00 0.91 1.00 0.94 0.00 0.01 
30 Smith 3.40 0.01 0.01 0.81 0.08 0.00 0.84 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.00 
9 Stone 3.96 0.80 0.02 0.90 0.52 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
46 Sunflower 3.11 0.01 0.05 0.76 0.09 0.00 0.63 0.15 0.67 0.00 0.75 
50 Tallahatchie 3.04 0.07 0.03 0.58 0.17 0.00 0.45 0.46 0.68 0.00 0.59 
44 Tate 3.14 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.18 0.00 0.23 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.16 
70 Tippah 2.60 0.01 0.00 0.72 0.21 0.00 0.12 0.66 0.82 0.00 0.06 
73 Tishomingo 2.55 0.01 0.01 0.82 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.92 0.00 0.05 
27 Tunica 3.52 0.04 0.05 0.73 0.13 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.53 
58 Union 2.85 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.62 0.95 0.00 0.21 
21 Walthall 3.72 0.01 0.03 0.94 0.53 0.00 0.64 0.55 1.00 0.00 0.02 
17 Warren 3.77 0.07 0.05 0.92 0.07 0.00 0.86 0.67 0.97 0.00 0.17 
38 Washington 3.23 0.00 0.25 0.89 0.22 0.00 0.59 0.29 0.48 0.00 0.51 
12 Wayne 3.92 0.48 0.02 0.90 0.56 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.91 0.00 0.01 
66 Webster 2.67 0.02 0.00 0.76 0.23 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.18 
11 Wilkinson 3.93 0.03 0.04 0.80 0.96 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.86 0.00 0.01 
60 Winston 2.81 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.23 0.00 0.62 0.18 0.87 0.00 0.01 
74 Yalobusha 2.54 0.00 0.01 0.59 0.14 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.79 0.00 0.09 
16 Yazoo 3.79 0.01 0.11 0.85 0.07 0.00 0.85 0.67 0.98 0.00 0.26 
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